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MUZZLING DEATH Row INMATES: Applying
The First Amendment to Regulations that
Restrict a Condemned Prisoner's Last Words
Kevin Francis O'Neill*
I. INTRODUCTION
As Nathan Hale stood on the gallows in 1776, awaiting execution by his
British captors, he was asked whether he had any last words. His dying
speech, brief but eloquent, resounds through history: "I only regret that I
have but one life to lose for my country."'
The privilege to utter a last dying speech in the moments just before
one's execution is a freedom that is deeply ingrained in Anglo-American
history and tradition. Visible as early as 1388,2 the privilege was
consistently honored at English executions throughout the sixteenth
century3 and took root on this side of the Atlantic in the seventeenth
* Assistant Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State
University. In composing this Article, I received invaluable help from research assistants
Melissa Day and Alex Gertsburg, and generous financial support from the Cleveland-Marshall
Fund. I owe a special debt of gratitude to my colleague, Professor Adam Thurschwell, who
drew my attention to the striking parallel between the right of allocution (that is, the right of a
criminal defendant to be heard just prior to sentencing) and the traditional privilege to be heard
just prior to being executed. Finally, the reader should know that I was lead counsel in a First
Amendment challenge by Death Row inmates to an Ohio prison policy that, until recently,
barred them from uttering a last dying speech in the moments before being executed. Treesh v.
Taft, No. C-2-99-624 (S.D. Ohio filed July 6, 1999). That lawsuit, which has now been settled,
prompted the State of Ohio to restore the traditional privilege to utter one's last words. Alan
Johnson, Last Words Back in Ohio's Execution Ritual, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Apr. 10, 2001,
available at http://www.dispatch.com/news/newsOl/aprO1/655029.html.
1. FREDERICK DRIMMER, UNTIL You ARE DEAD: TIH-E BOOK OF EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA
145-46 (1990); BENSON J. LOSSING, THE Two SPIES: NATHAN HALE AND JOHN ANDRE 23 (New
York, D. Appleton & Co. 1886); JEAN CHRISTIE ROOT, NATHAN HALE 86 (1923); 1.W. STUART,
LIFE OF CAPTAIN NATHAN HALE: THE MARTYR-SPY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 142
(Hartford, F.A. Brown 1856).
2. 1 COBBETr'S COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 89, 118-19 (London, R. Bagshaw
1809) [hereinafter 1 COBBETT'S] (discussing the trial of Nicholas Brambre (Parliament 1388)).
3. See, e.g., id. at 395, 406-08 (discussing the trialof John Fisher (K.B. 1535)); id. at 433,
437-38 (discussing the trial of Thomas Cromwell (K.B. 1541)); id. at 515, 523-24 (discussing
the trial of Edward, Duke of Somerset (K.B. 1551)); id. at 715, 728-30 (discussing the trial of
Lady Jane Grey (Q.B. 1553)); id. at 1085, 1085-88 (discussing the trial of John Felton (Q.B.
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century. 4 . It was available to everyone: from kings,5 queens,6 and
aristocrats 7 to the poorest of the poor.8 Indeed, the privilege was extended
to individuals conspicuously bereft of most rights: including "witches," 9
slaves, 10 and prisoners of war." Even a Tennessee lynch mob saw fit to
afford its victim the right to deliver a last dying speech. 12
1570)); id. at 947, 952-53 (discussing the trial of James, Earl of Mortoun (Q.B. 1581));
id. at 1141, 1156-60 (discussing the trial of Edward Abington (Q.B. 1586)); id. at 1161, 1210
(discussing the trialof Mary, Queen of Scots (Q.B. 1586)). By 1606, with the execution of Guy
Fawkes and his coconspirators in the Gunpowder Plot, the privilege to make a dying speech was
already well established. ANTONIA FRASER, FAITH AND TREASON: THE STORY OF THE
GUNPOWDER PLOT 229-34, 265 (1996).
4. At their hanging on Boston Common in 1659, three Quaker missionaries were given
the privilege to utter their last words. DRIMMER, supra note 1, at 138-39. Last words were also
afforded George Burroughs, executed in Massachusetts for witchcraft in 1692. Id. at 142. The
privilege was also extended to a murderer executed in Boston in 1726. Id. at 135.
5. Executed in 1649, King Charles I of England gave a long speech from the scaffold.
JOSEPH KAINES, LAST WORDS OF EMINENT PERSONS 62-65 (London, George Routledge & Sons
1866).
6. See GEOFFREY BRYAN, OFF WITH HIS HEAD 79 (1934) (discussing the trial of Anne
Boleyn in 1536); L.A. PARRY, THE HISTORY OF TORTURE IN ENGLAND 132-33 (1975) (same);
KAINES, supra note 5, at 37 (same). See also 1 COBBETr'S, supra note 2, at 1161, 1210
(discussing the trial of Mary, Queen of Scots (Q.B. 1586)).
7. 1 COBBETT'S, supra note 2, at 515, 523-24 (discussing the trial of Edward, Duke of
Somerset (K.B. 1551)); id. at 947, 952-53 (discussing the trial of James, Earl of Mortoun (Q.B.
1581)); id. at 1333, 1359-60 (discussing the trial of Robert, Earl of Essex (House of Lords
1600)); 7 COBBETT'S COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 1293, 1564-68 (London,
R.Bagshaw 1810) [hereinafter 7 COBBETT'S] (discussing the trial of William, Viscount Stafford
(House of Lords 1680)); 9 COBBETT'S COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 577, 683-84
(London, R. Bagshaw 1811) [hereinafter 9 COBBETT'S] (discussing the trial of Lord Russell
(K.B. 1683)).
8. V.A.C. GATRELL, THE HANGING TREE: EXECUTION AND THE ENGLISH PEOPLE, 1770-
1868, at 8, 34, 35, 355, 439 (1994).
9. George Burroughs, executed in Massachusetts for witchcraft in 1692, was allowed to
deliver a dying speech in the moments before his hanging. DRIMMER, supra note 1, at 142.
Professing his innocence, Burroughs spoke so eloquently that many in the audience were moved
to tears. Id.
10. The privilege was extended to Nat Turner, a black slave who led an 1831 revolt in
which fifty-five whites were shot, beheaded, or hacked to death. DRIMMER, supra note 1, at
152-54.
11. The privilege was afforded a British prisoner of war, John Andre, when he was
executed under orders from General George Washington in 1780. DRIMMER, supra note 1, at
147-50; LOSSING, supra note 1, at 105; SCOTT SLATER & ALEC SOLOMITA, EXITS: STORIES OF
DYING MOMENTS & PARTING WORDS 21-22 (1980).
12. MARK CURRIDEN & LEROY PHILLIPS, JR., CONTEMPT OF COURT: 'ME TURN-OF-THE-
CENTURY LYNCHING THAT LAUNCHED 100 YEARS OF FEDERALISM 212-13 (1999) (relating
eyewitness accounts of a lynching on March 19, 1906 in Chattanooga, Tennessee).
1160
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Condemned prisoners use their last words for a broad variety of
purposes. 13 Often they apologize to the victim's family 14 or say goodbye to
kin of their own.' 5  Many profess their innocence.' 6  Some express
13. See Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Executed Offenders Website, at
http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/executedoffenders.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2002) [hereinafter
Executed Offenders Website]. This website offers information on every Texas execution since
December 7, 1982-including the name and race of the prisoner, the date of his execution, and a
quotation of his last words, if any.
14. Executed in Texas on October 12, 1999, Alvin Crane's last words were: "I just want
to say I'm sorry to the family. I know I caused you a lot of pain and suffering and I hope that
you will find some peace and comfort in [my execution]." Executed Offenders Website, supra
note 13. Warren McCleskey, executed in Georgia on September 25, 1991, used his dying
speech to declare: "To the Schlatt family, I am deeply repentant for the suffering, hurt and pain
you have endured. I wish there was something I could do or say that would bring comfort to
you, though I'm sure these words offer very little comfort .... [I know] the words I express
will never give you the peace you ask for. I wish this execution could give it to you, but I know
it won't, only temporary satisfaction." Bill Montgomery, Infamous Last Words, ATLANTA
JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Apr. 2, 1995, available at 1995 WL 6518032. Executed in Utah in
1988, Arthur Gary Bishop's last words were: "Give my apologies to the families of the
victims." Prisoners' Last Words Cover Wide Spectrum, I.AS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, May 4,
1992, available at 1992 WL 5971829 [hereinafter Prisoners' Last Words]. Condemned Texas
prisoner Dennis Dowthitt, executed on March 7, 2001, used his dying speech to tell the
bereaved family: "I am so sorry for what y'all had to go through.... I can't imagine losing two
children. If I was ya'll, I would have killed me.... I am really so sorry about it, I really am."
Executed Offenders Website, supra note 13. William Kitchens, executed in Texas on May 9,
2000, issued an extended apology to the victim's family, repeatedly stressing his inability to
express how sorry he was. Id. At his execution on November 17, 1999, Texas prisoner John
Michael Lamb used his last words to say: "I'm sorry, I wish I could bring him back. I can't.
Goodbye. Do it." Id.; David Isay & Stacy Abramson, No. 587: A Death Row Inmate Tells His
Own Life Story, NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, Jan. 2,2000, at 34.
15. Ted Bundy, the serial killer who died in Florida's electric chair on January 25, 1989,
used his last words to say: "Give my love to my family and friends." Prisoners' Last Words,
supra note 14. Tony Chambers, executed in Texas on November 15, 2000, used his dying
speech to say: "Mom, I just want ya'll to know that I love you. No matter what in life, I want
you to stay strong." Executed Offenders Website, supra note 13. At his execution in Alabama
on November 20, 1992, Cornelius Singleton directed his last words to his brother, who was
present among the witnesses. "Let mama know I still love her," he said, adding, "Keep that
chin up." Garry Mitchell, Man Convicted of Killing Nun Executed, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov.
20, 1992, available at 1992 WL 5326210. Henry Francis Hays, another Alabama prisoner,
likewise addressed his last words to his brother, saying simply: "I love you." Paul Vitello, It
Was Just Your Average Execution, NEWSDAY, June 10, 1997, available at 1997 WL 2698298.
16. At his Georgia execution on January 9, 1985, Roosevelt Green used his last words to
proclaim: "I am about to die for a murder that I did not commit, that someone else committed."
Prisoners'Last Words, supra note 14. Executed on March 31, 1994, another Georgia prisoner,
William Henry Hance, used his dying speech to assert: "Right at this very moment I can prove
my innocence .... There was no motive. There were no witnesses. There were no clues."
Montgomery, supra note 14. The last words of Eugene Wallace Perry, executed in Arkansas on
August 6, 1997, were simply: "I am innocent of this crime." Paisley Dodds, Arkansas Killer
Executed as Victims' Kin Watches; Prisoner Denies Crime in Last Words, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Aug. 7, 1997, available at 1997 WL 11964992. Executed in California on July 14, 1998,
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forgiveness.' 7 Others turn reflective or confessional: lamenting a wasted
life,' 8 admitting their guilt,' 9 or ruminating about their imminent demise. 0
Thomas M. Thompson used his last words to declare: "For 17 years, the attorney general has
been pursuing the wrong man." Larry D. Hatfield & Michael Dougan, Insists on His Innocence
to the End, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, July 14, 1998, available at 1998 WL 5187658. Each of
the following Texas prisoners used his dying speech to profess his innocence: Richard Jones,
executed on August 22, 2000 ("I want the victim's family to know that I didn't commit this
crime. I didn't kill your loved one. [Then, turning to the prosecutor:] Ya'll convicted an
innocent man and you know it."); Orien Cecil Joiner, executed on July 12, 2000 ("I am innocent
of this crime and God knows I am innocent and the four people that was murdered know I am
innocent and when I get to heaven I'll [find] you and we'll talk."); Thomas Mason, executed on
June 12, 2000 (asserting that his conviction was based on "more than 30 altered or falsified
records"); Frank Basil McFarland, executed on April 19, 1998 ("I owe no apologies for a crime
I did not commit. Those who lied and fabricated evidence against me will have to answer for
what they have done."); Carl Johnson, executed on September 19, 1995 ("I want the world to
know that I'm innocent and that I've found peace. Let's ride."); Leonel Torres Herrera,
executed on May 12, 1993 ("I am innocent, innocent, innocent. Make no mistake about this; I
owe society nothing."). Executed Offenders Website, supra note 13.
17. At his May 4, 1999 execution, California prisoner Manuel Pina Babbitt directed his
last words to San Quentin's warden, saying: "I forgive all of you." Larry D. Hatfield, Babbitt's
Last Words: 'I Forgive... You', SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, May 4, 1999, available at 1999
WL 6872501. The following Texas prisoners likewise used their last words to forgive their
executioners: Gary Miller, executed on December 5, 2000 ("Lord, be merciful with those who
are actively involved with the taking of my life, forgive them as I am forgiving them."); Billy C.
Gardner, executed on February 16, 1995 ("I forgive all of you-hope God forgives all of you
too."); Thomas Barefoot, executed on October 30,1984 ("I want everybody to know that I hold
nothing against them. I forgive them all."); Ronald Clark O'Bryan, executed on March 30,
1984 ("forgiv[ing] all who have taken part in any way in my death"). Executed Offenders
Website, supra note 13.
18. At his execution on January 27, 2000, Texas prisoner James Moreland used his last
words to declare: "I stole 2 lives and I know it was precious to ya'll. That's the story of my
whole [life], that's what alcohol will do for you." Executed Offenders Website, supra note 13.
Executed in Nevada on March 30, 1996, Richard Moran directed his last words to the victim's
family: "To those I've hurt, I would never ask you to forgive me for what I've done to you by
killing the [person] you love.... I chose my lifestyle of drugs and alcohol so there is no one to
blame but me." Sean Whaley, Men See Sister's Killer Die, LAS VEGAS REviEw-JOURNAL, Mar.
31, 1996, available at 1996 WL 2338119. In his dying speech on February 29, 1984, Louisiana
prisoner Johnny Davis Taylor Jr. said: "I've done a lot of wrong ... I guess this is the price I
pay.... Living has been hard, and now it's time to die." Killer's Final Words: 'Now It's Time
To Die, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Feb. 29, 1984, available at 1984 WL 2271686.
19. Emblematic of these dying confessions are the following examples from Texas
executions: Jeffery Dillingham, executed on November 1, 2000 ("I would just like to apologize
to the victim's family for what I did. I take full responsibility for that poor woman's death
.... ); Robert Carter, executed on May 31, 2000 ("It was me and me alone."); David Herman,
executed on April 2, 1997 ("It was horrible and inexcusable for me to take the life of your loved
one ...."). Executed Offenders Website, supra note 13.
20. Robert Alton Harris, executed in California on April 21, 1992 ("You can be a king or a
street sweeper, but everybody dances with the Grim Reaper."). Last Words, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, May 5, 1993, available at 1993 WL 9591524. David Gibbs, executed in Texas on
August 23, 2000 ("Death is but a brief moment's slumber and a short journey home. I'll see
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Still others turn political: criticizing the death penalty, 2' excoriating the
22 23justice system, 22 or expressing solidarity with a movement or cause.
Finally--and, given the circumstances, it is surprising that this is so rare---a
you when you get there."). Executed Offenders Website, supra note 13. Richard Tucker,
executed in Georgia on May 22, 1987 ("It has taken some time [to realize it], but I am a part of
everyone and everyone is a part of me. No matter where I go or how I go, everyone goes with
me."). Montgomery, supra note 14. Ignacio Cuevas, executed in Texas on May 23, 1991 ("I'm
going to a beautiful place. O.K., Warden, roll 'em."). Executed Offenders Website, supra note
13. John William Rook, executed in North Carolina in 1985 (uttered after the lethal injection
had commenced) ("Freedom. Freedom at last, man."). Prisoners' Last Words, supra note 14.
21. Warren McCleskey, executed in Georgia on September 25, 1991, concluded his dying
speech by declaring: "I pray that one day this country, which is supposed to be civilized, will
abolish barbaric acts such as this death penalty." Montgomery, supra note 14. At his Texas
execution on October 30, 1984, Thomas Barefoot said with his last words: "I hope that one day
we can look back on the evil that we're doing right now like the witches we burned at the
stake." Executed Offenders Website, supra note 13. At his execution on January 4, 1995, Jesse
Jacobs asserted: "This is pre-meditated murder by the appointed district attorney and the state
of Texas." Last Words of Some of the 99 Executed in Texas Since 1982, NEW YORK BEACON,
Oct. 11, 1995, available at 1995 WL 15448596. "Remember," added Texas inmate Robert
Nelson Drew at his August 2, 1994 execution, "the death penalty is murder." Executed
Offenders Website, supra note 13. At his execution in California on February 23, 1996, William
Bonin used his last words to declare: "The death penalty is not an answer to the problems at
hand." Mark Katches & Keith Stone, Families Finally Feel Sense of Relief, Los ANGELES
DAILY NEWS, Feb. 24, 1996, available at 1996 WL 6547932. One inmate actually used his last
words to alert the witnesses--including his lawyer and the press-that his own execution was
being botched. Bennie Demps, executed in.Florida on June 7, 2000, used his dying speech to
plead for an investigation into the way that his executioners had handled him. Demps asserted
that the state's technicians, struggling to insert the lethal intravenous drip into his veins, had
twice sliced painfully into his body, stitching up one wound before wheeling him into the
execution chamber. "They butchered me back there," said Demps from his gumey. "I was in a
lot of pain. They cut me in the groin, they cut me in the leg. I was bleeding profusely." Rick
Bragg, Inmate Says Execution Was Botched, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, June 9, 2000, at 10-A.
22. Gary Graham, executed in Texas on June 22, 2000 (professing his innocence, asserting
that exculpatory evidence was withheld from the jury, and describing the justice system as
perpetrating the institutionalized "lynching" of impoverished blacks). Executed Offenders
Website, supra note 13. John C. Young, executed in Georgia on March 20, 1985 (asserting that
our justice system favors the rich while 'Inanipulat[ing]" the poor) ("The poor... don't have a
chance because the courts don't really recognize them. People look on them as between human
and animals, but we're all from the same creation .... This is the way America will always
be .... I'm not sorry to be leaving this world. Being born black in America was against me.").
Montgomery, supra note 14.
23. Executed in Chicago in 1887, the Haymarket defendants were prominent leaders of the
anarchist movement. Seconds before they were hanged en masse, they shouted from the
scaffold: "Hurrah for anarchy!" PAUL AVRICH, THE HAYMARKET TRAGEDY 393 (1984); HENRY
DAVID, THE HISTORY OF THE HAYMARKET AFFAIR 463 (1958). The anarchist Nicola Sacco,
executed in the electric chair 1927, used his last words to declare: "Long live anarchy!"
DRIMMER, supra note 1, at 35. Much more recently, James Beathard (executed in Texas on
December 9, 1999) used a portion of his dying speech to castigate the United States for
"harming innocent children" through "[t]he ongoing embargo and sanctions against places like
Iran and Iraq [and] Cuba." Executed Offenders Website, supra note 13.
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few turn angry: raging against their accusers, their prosecutors, or their
executioners .24
Notwithstanding its ancient lineage and frequent use, this privilege has
never been recognized by an American court as a First Amendment right. It
is not that our courts have rejected the notion; they have simply never been
asked to decide the question. But that is about to change. Several
25 26 2
states-including Pennsylvania, Illinois, North Carolina,27  South
24. The last words of Jimmie Wayne Jeffers, executed in Arizona by lethal injection on
September 13, 1995, were an eruption of rage at his executioners. With the lifting of the curtain
that separated him from the witnesses, Jeffers glared through the thick glass window, thrust out
his middle finger, and let loose with a torrent of obscenities. His fury was focused on the law
enforcement and prison officials who had come to see him die. This tirade continued for 30
seconds until Jeffers, overcome by the sodium pentathol, began heaving violently and then fell
still. Even in death, his middle finger remained extended. Michael R. Graham, Jeffers Uses
Last Words to Curse, TUCSON CITIZEN, Sept. 14, 1995, available at 1995 WL 8973304; Susie
Steckner, Defiant to the End; Killer's Last Words a Stream of Curses, PHOENIX GAZETTE,
Sept. 14, 1995, available at 1995 WL 2828631; Witnesses to Death; What Was it Like?,
ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Jan. 22, 1998, available at 1998 WL 7745110 [hereinafter Witnesses to
Death]. Donald Eugene Harding, executed in Arizona's gas chamber on April 6, 1992, likewise
used his middle finger to bid an obscene farewell. With a bitter smile, Harding waited until the
gas began billowing up before twice gesturing at the witnesses. Witnesses to Death, supra;
Prisoners 'Last Words, supra note 14. Executed on April 19, 1995, Arkansas prisoner Richard
Wayne Snell used his last words to threaten the governor, suggesting that his execution would
be avenged. "Governor Tucker," he said, "look over your shoulder; justice is coming."
Arkansas Executes White Supremacist; Killer's Last Words Threat to Governor, NEW YORK
TIMES, Apr. 21, 1995, available at 1995 WL 6873268. At his December 9, 1999 execution,
Texas prisoner James Beathard asserted that the prosecutor knowingly used perjured testimony
to gain his conviction. Executed Offenders Website, supra note 13. Finally, at his execution on
March 3, 1992, Texas prisoner Edward Ellis used his dying speech to declare: "I just want
everyone to know that the prosecutor and Bill Scott are sorry sons of bitches." Executed
Offenders Website, supra note 13.
25. E-mail from Michael Lukens, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, to Alex
Gertsburg, Research Assistant to Professor Kevin Francis O'Neill, Cleveland-Marshall College
of Law (Feb. 29, 2000, 12:00:54 EST) (on file with author) ("[N]o final statement to the public
will be made from the injection chamber. The only final statement permitted must be in written
form [and] the final statement must be completed one-half hour prior to the scheduled
execution.... The final statement generally is read to execution witnesses by a department
staff member after the execution, and the department's press secretary distributes the statement
to the news media.") (emphasis added). See Dennis B. Roddy, Secrecy Governs Execution
Process, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Apr. 23, 1995, available at 1995 WL 3378530
(confirming that condemned prisoners in Pennsylvania are not afforded the chance to express
any last words inside the execution chamber).
26. E-mail from Erik Lyons, Illinois Department of Corrections, to Alex Gertsburg,
Research Assistant to Professor Kevin Francis O'Neill, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law
(Jan. 24, 2000, 10:10:37 EST) (on file with author) (explaining that Illinois has no written
policies or procedures regarding the last words of condemned prisoners, but that the practice has
been for the inmate to put them in writing, to be relayed to the media at a press conference after
the execution). See Scott Fornek, How Gacy Would Be Put to Death; Details Include
Restriction on Last Words, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Apr. 11, 1994, available at 1994 WL 5557181
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Carolina, 28 and, until just recently, Ohio 29-- do not allow a condemned
prisoner to utter a last dying speech in the execution chamber. Other
(quoting Nic Howell, a state corrections department spokesman, on how the last words of
condemned prisoner John Wayne Gacy would be communicated: "If he wants to say something
profound or long, we will ask that he do it in writing in his cell.") (dding that any oral
comments that Gacy might make will be uttered before the visitors' gallery will be opened).
27. E-mail from Stephanie Teachey, North Carolina Department of Corrections, to Alex
Gertsburg, Research Assistant to Professor Kevin Francis O'Neill, Cleveland-Marshall College
of Law (Feb. 7, 2000, 08:29:05 EST) (on file with author) (under North Carolina's policy, any
last words must be written out by the prisoner and submitted to the warden 30 minutes prior to
the execution; the warden's office transcribes the statement and issues it to the news media only
after the prisoner is dead). Death penalty opponents in North Carolina confirm that this is how
the State conducts its executions-and they report that trying to speak one's last words is futile
because witnesses cannot hear anything through the thick glass that separates them from the
execution chamber. E-mail from Sara Sanders to Alex Gertsburg, Research Assistant to
Professor Kevin Francis O'Neill, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law (Jan. 12, 2000, 11:35:11
EST) (on file with author). But one North Carolina prisoner, by screaming at the top of his
lungs, did manage to communicate a message. The prisoner, David Lawson, was put to death in
1994. As a fog of lethal gas began rising around him, Dawson, screaming with all his might,
seemed to be saying: "I'm human! I'm human!" Executed Murderer's Final Words: 'I'm
Human, I'm Human!,'ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 15, 1994, available at 1994 WL 6480938.
28. E-mail from John Barkley, South Carolina Department of Corrections, to Alex
Gertsburg, Research Assistant to Professor Kevin Francis O'Neill, Cleveland-Marshall College
of Law (Mar. 2, 2000, 14:43:31 EST) (on file with author) ("In South Carolina the condemned
is allowed to have their last statement read by their attorney a few minutes before the execution.
The statement must be written so that it can be read by the attorney. Copies of the statement are
then provided to the media following the execution.").
29. Treesh v. Taft, 122 F. Supp. 2d 881, 882 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (describing Ohio's policy
as "prohibit[ing] death row inmates from making a final oral statement, audible to spectators, in
the moments before their executions," requiring them instead to put their last words in writing
six hours prior to the execution, and authorizing the release of a transcribed version of the
prisoner's last statement only after he is dead); Alan Johnson, Last Words Will Be Posthumous
Ones for Ohio's Condemned, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July 27, 1997, available at 1997 WL
12513136 [hereinafter Last Words Will Be Posthumous]; John Nolan, Ohio Sets Stage for
Execution, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 29, 1997, available at LEXIS, News Library, AP File;
Ohio to Allow No Last Words Before Execution, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 9, 1998, available at
1998 WL 4114315 [hereinafter No Last Words]; Ohio to Stifle Condemned's Last Words, THE
PANTAGRAPH, Jan. 6, 1998, available at 1998 WL 5460002 [hereinafter Ohio to Stifle Last
Words]. In response to the Treesh lawsuit, Ohio prison officials acted in April 2001 to restore
the traditional privilege to utter a dying speech. Johnson, supra note *. Pursuant to the
settlement of that lawsuit, Ohio's execution policy was rewritten to incorporate specific
protections for last words. Under the new policy, issued in September 2001, the prisoner must
be allowed to deliver an uncensored speech inside the execution chamber immediately before
the lethal injection commences. The policy requires that the prisoner be afforded a microphone
to ensure that his last words are audible to the assembled witnesses, who view the scene from
behind thick panes of glass. See Ted Wendling, Settlement Allows Condemned to Say Last
Words Uncensored, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 14, 2001, available at 2001 WL
20550362.
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states-including Maryland,3°  Virginia,31  California,32  and
Nevada 3 3-allow the speech to be made, but only outside the presence or
30. In Maryland, the condemned prisoner must privately confide his last words to the
warden, outside the presence of the witnesses. His only opportunity to utter a final statement
takes place before the witnesses are ushered into the viewing chamber. Paul W. Valentine, A
Look at . . . Executions; The Death I Didn't See; Maryland's Ritual Shrouds the State's
Awesome Power, WASHINGTON POST, July 20, 1997, available at 1997 WL 11974835.
31. In Virginia, the prisoner is invited to utter a last statement inside the execution
chamber--but his words are inaudible to those in the witness room. Frank Green, Watkins Dies
for Danville Fatal Robbery; Born-Again Christian 's Last Words: Apologies to Families,
RICHMONDTIMES-DISPATCH, Mar. 26, 1998, available at 1998 WL 2030658. A prison official
stands next to the inmate, listens to his last words, and then transcribes them for release to the
news media after the execution. E-mail from Larry Traylor, Director of Communications,
Virginia Department of Corrections, to Alex Gertsburg, Research Assistant to Professor Kevin
Francis O'Neill, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law (Feb. 14, 2000, 14:21:43 EST) (on file
with author).
32. A spokesperson for the California Department of Corrections conceded that the last
words of California prisoners are inaudible to the assembled witnesses because San Quentin's
death chamber is walled with thick glass and the prisoner is afforded no microphone.
Telephone Interview with Margot Bach, Information Officer, California Department of
Corrections (July 6, 2001). Though California's prison regulations do not specifically address
last words, the practice, she said, is for the prisoner to confide his last words to the warden
shortly before being put to death. Id. This takes place, she said, inside the execution chamber,
with the prisoner already strapped to a gurney and the witnesses already watching. Id. The
prisoner simply speaks his last words, often in a whisper, directly to the warden, who promptly
relays them by phone to the Emergency Operations Center, which is situated within the
Administration Building inside the San Quentin Prison not far from the death chamber. Id.
Later, after the execution, the warden discloses the prisoner's last words to the news media. Id.
Recent news reports confirm that California prisoners are effectively denied the chance to
address a dying speech to the assembled witnesses and that their last words are communicated
only through the warden. The executions of William Bonin (Feb. 23, 1996), Thomas Thompson
(July 13, 1998), and Manuel Babbitt (May 4, 1999) each involved a procedure in which the
condemned prisoner could communicate his last words only through the warden. None of them
featured a dying speech from the execution chamber. Indeed, the account of Thompson's
execution makes clear that no microphone was available to him, and that all he could do was
mouth goodbyes to friends and relatives who watched from behind a thick pane of glass. See
Hatfield & Dougan, supra note 16 (describing the Thompson execution); Katches & Stone,
supra note 21 (describing the Bonin execution); Maria L. La Ganga, California and the West;
Executions Eliciting a Growing Indifference; Justice: Pace of Capital Punishment in State is
Gaining Momentum, But Media, Public Interest Seem to be Waning, LOS ANGELES TIMES, May
5, 1999, available at 1999 WL 2155684 (describing the Babbitt execution).
But these reports conflict with the spokesperson's account in one crucial respect. Contrary
to her assertion that the prisoner confides his last words only moments before being executed,
these accounts describe a 30- to 60-minute delay between the utterance of his "last words" and
his death by lethal injection. Katches & Stone, supra note 21 (describing a 30-minute delay in
the Bonin execution); Hatfield & Dougan, supra note 16 (describing a 45-minute delay in the
Thompson execution); La Ganga, supra (describing a 60-minute delay in the Babbitt execution).
Such an approach would seem effectively identical to the policies in Pennsylvania, Illinois, and
North Carolina, where a spontaneous brink-of-death speech is banned and the prisoner must
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beyond the hearing of the witnesses. These policies invite constitutional
challenge, and one such challenge has already been launched in Ohio.34
This Article asserts that the privilege to deliver a last dying speech
-uttered in the presence of, and made audible to, the assembled witnesses
in the moments just before one's execution--is a First Amendment right,
and that prison policies departing from its traditional exercise are
unconstitutional. After canvassing the state prison policies that govern last
words,35 this Article will recount the long historical tradition surrounding
their utterance-a history that reveals the extraordinary degree to which
Anglo-American governments have honored the privilege.36 Next, this
Article will draw a parallel between the right to utter one's last words and
the well-established right of"allocution"-the right to be heard just prior to
sentencing.37 Finally, this Article will perform a First Amendment analysis
of the prison policies that restrict last words. This analysis will begin with
"first principles," 38 examining the policies in terms of the reasons why our
law protects free expression. The analysis section will then proceed by
invoking a succession of First Amendment doctrines. We will perform, in
turn, a prior restraint analysis, 39 a content-neutrality analysis, 4° a public
submit his "last words" at least 30 minutes before entering the execution chamber. See supra
notes 25-27.
33. In Nevada, witnesses cannot hear the last words of condemned prisoners; they are
inaudible through the thick glass of the viewing windows. Nevada Killer, 26, Executed by
Injection, LOS ANGELES TIMES, June 4, 1990, available at 1990 WL 2386083. Reporters learn
of a prisoner's final statement only through the warden, who discloses the statement after the
execution. See Sean Whaley, Double Murderer Executed, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL,
Apr. 6, 1999, available at 1999 WL 9280569.
34. Treesh v. Taft, No. C-2-99-624 (S.D. Ohio filed July 6, 1999). See Lee Leonard,
ACLU Wants to Give Voice to Condemned, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July 7, 1999, at IC; ACLU
Sues to Block Ohio Law that Silences Last Words of Death Row Inmates, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
July 7, 1999, available at LEXIS, News Library, AP File. In April 2001, the State of Ohio
abandoned the challenged policy, restoring the traditional privilege to utter a dying speech.
Johnson, supra note *. The Treesh lawsuit has now been settled. Pursuant to the settlement,
Ohio's execution policy was rewritten to incorporate affirmative protections for last words.
Wendling, supra note 29. The lawsuit produced two reported decisions, but both focused on
procedural issues and neither reached the substantive First Amendment question posed by the
challenge. See Treesh v. Taft, 122 F. Supp. 2d 881, 887 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (rejecting mootness
and ripeness defenses asserted by the government); Treesh v. Taft, 122 F. Supp. 2d 887 (S.D.
Ohio 2000) (addressing a prisoner's duty to exhaust administrative remedies under § 7(a) of the
Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)).
35. See infra Section II.
36. See infra Section III.A.
37. See infra Section III.B.
38. See infra Section IV.A.
39. See infra Section IV.B.
40. See infra Section IV.C.
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forum analysis, 41 an overbreadth analysis, 42 a restricted environment
analysis,43 and an original intent analysis."4
II. CONTEMPORARY PRISON REGULATIONS THAT RESTRICT
THE LAST WORDS OF CONDEMNED PRISONERS
45
State prison policies governing last words come in many forms. Texas
does it the old-fashioned way: As the last act prior to execution, the warden
is required to ask the prisoner if he has any last words. 46 If the prisoner
wants to speak, he must be allowed to give his speech in full. 47 The policy
imposes no durational or editorial restrictions,48 and the prisoner makes his
statement in full view of the witnesses (who watch from an adjacent
chamber behind thick glass windows), made audible to them by means of a
microphone. 49 Florida5 ° and Louisiana 51 have similar policies.
41. See infra Section IV.D.
42. See infra Section IV.E.
43. See infra Section IV.F.
44. See infra Section IV.G.
45. Prison policies governing the final hours (and, hence, the last words) of condemned
prisoners are usually unpublished. They are not to be found in statutory or administrative codes.
Instead, they tend to be maintained far from public view-in file cabinets at the state
department of corrections and at the prison where executions are conducted. Thus, it was
extremely difficult to research the substantive content of these policies. Nevertheless, we sent
inquiries by email to the department of corrections in each of the 38 states where the death
penalty is currently in force: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. We received responses
from virtually every state---and we supplemented that information in two ways: (1) by
collecting news reports describing how executions in various states were conducted; and (2)
through listserv inquiries of death penalty scholars and public defenders across the nation.
Texas is the only state whose "last words" policy has been published, and the policy appears not
in a codebook but in an appendix to a history book: JAMES W. MARQUART ET AL., THE ROPE,
THE CHAIR, AND THE NEEDLE: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN TEXAS, 1923-1990 (1994) (Appendix Q
[hereinafter CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN TEXAS].
46. The Texas policy provides that after the inmate has been strapped to the gurney in the
execution chamber, with catheters placed in each arm, and after the witnesses have been ushered
into the adjacent viewing chamber, "The Warden will then ask the condemned inmate for his
last statement. If the inmate has a statement, he is allowed to make it. The Warden then states,
'We are ready."' At this point, the lethal injection immediately commences. CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT IN TEXAS, supra note 45, at 238-39.
47. Id. at 238.
48. Id.
49. Rick Halperin, Witness to an Extermination, OCADP Home Page (Oregon Coalition to
Abolish the Death Penalty), at http://members.tripod.com/ocadp (last visited Jan. 2, 2002)
(furnishing an eyewitness account of a Texas execution--the lethal injection of Frank
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Many states are more restrictive. In Kentucky52 and Utah,5 3 the prisoner
is allowed to give a dying speech, but it cannot exceed two minutes. In
Nevada,54 Virginia,55 and California,56 the prisoner is allowed to speak, but
he is denied a microphone--so his words are inaudible to the witnesses. In
Maryland,57 likewise, the witnesses never hear his last words, because the
prisoner is compelled to give his speech before they are ushered in.
Some states forbid the utterance of a dying speech altogether. In
Pennsylvania,58 Illinois,59 North Carolina, 60 South Carolina,61 and (until just
recently) Ohio, 62 the prisoner is simply not allowed to utter his last words in
the execution chamber. Instead, the prisoner is required to write them out in
McFarland on April 29, 1999); Denis Johnson, Five Executions and a Barbecue, ROLLING
STONE, Aug. 17, 2000, at 123 (describing how executions are conducted in Texas, while
reporting on five lethal injections that were carried out by Texas officials between May 9 and
May 26, 2000); Sara Rimer, In the Busiest Death Chamber, Duty Carries Its Own Burdens,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2000 (furnishing an eyewitness account of a Texas execution-he lethal
injection of Garry Miller on December 5, 2000). See 37 Tex. Admin. Code § 152.51(g)(2)
(West 2000) (effective Feb. 2, 1996) (providing that a condemned prisoner's last words must be
made audible to those in attendance at the execution).
50. E-mail from Debra Buchanan, Florida Department of Corrections, to Alex Gertsburg,
Research Assistant to Professor Kevin Francis O'Neill, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law
(Jan. 25, 2000, 08:32:08 EST) (on file with author). See Michael Browning, Botched Efforts
Scar Capital Punishment; Legislature to Consider Lethal Injection, PALM BEACH POST, Jan. 3,
2000, available at 2000 WL 7592823 (recounting how one Florida inmate, asked if he had any
last words, proceeded to give a 45-minute lecture).
51. According to death penalty opponents in Louisiana, condemned prisoners are freely
allowed to utter their last words in the moments just before being executed. E-mail from Kathy
Gess, Director of Louisiana CURE, to Alex Gertsburg, Research Assistant to Professor Kevin
Francis O'Neill, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law (Jan. 13, 2000, 18:10:00 EST) (on file
with author). See Killer's Final Words: 'Now It's Time to Die,' SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE,
Feb. 29, 1984, available at 1984 WL 2271686 (recounting a Louisiana execution in which the
prisoner read a three-minute statement just before his death).
52. E-mail from Philip Parker, Warden, Kentucky State Penitentiary, to Alex Gertsburg,
Research Assistant to Professor Kevin Francis O'Neill, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law
(Feb. 7, 2000, 15:34:42 EST) (on file with author) (confirming that the inmate, though afforded
a microphone so that his last words are audible to witnesses, is allowed no more than two
minutes to speak).
53. At executions in Utah, the condemned is afforded a microphone in the death chamber,
but his last words may not exceed two minutes. Greg Burton, Parsons Gets Wish: Execution,
SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Oct. 15, 1999, available at 1999 WL 3383493.
54. See supra note 33.
55. See supra note 31.
56. See supra note 32.
57. See supra note 30.
58. See supra note 25.
59. See supra note 26.
60. See supra note 27.
61. See supra note 28.
62. See supra notes 29, 34.
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advance and then surrender them for delivery by someone else. 63 In South
Carolina,64 the prisoner's lawyer is allowed to read them at some point prior
to the execution. In the other four states, 65 the prisoner must entrust his
statement to the warden's office for transcription and release only after he is
dead.
A closer look at Ohio's approach will offer insight into the nature and
purpose of these restrictive policies. Until April 2001, 66 condemned
67prisoners in Ohio were not allowed to speak at the time of their execution.
Instead, their "last words" were to be written out six hours in advance and
submitted to the warden,68 to be released only after the prisoner was dead.69
When this policy was first adopted, Ohio prison officials asserted that the
warden would enjoy "complete editorial rights" over the prisoner's
statement,70 with unfettered discretion to change it, cut it, summarize it, or
censor it altogether.7' The aim of the policy, they said, was to shield the
friends and relatives of murder victims from "potentially spiteful, profane,
or abusive remarks" by those condemned to die.72 Thus, prisoners would be
barred from speaking to the assembled witnesses, and even their written
statements would be carefully screened for unpleasant remarks. The prison
officials said that when reviewing the condemned's written statement, the
warden would scan it for any passage that was "potentially offensive," and,
upon finding such a passage, would send the statement back to the prisoner
with instructions to change it. 73  Should the prisoner refuse, the warden
"will have discretion to [censor] that part of the statement-or the entire
63. See supra notes 25-29.
64. See supra note 28.
65. See supra notes 25-27, 29.
66. See Johnson, supra note *.
67. Treesh v. Taft, 122 F. Supp. 2d 881, 884 (S.D. Ohio 2000); No Last Words, supra note
29; Ohio to Stifle Last Words, supra note 29.
68. Treesh, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 882.
69. Id.
70. Last Words Will Be Posthumous, supra note 29.
71. No Last Words, supra note 29; Ohio to Stifle Last Words, supra note 29; Last Words
Will Be Posthumous, supra note 29.
72. No Last Words, supra note 29; Ohio to Stifle Last Words, supra note 29. The chief
impetus for Ohio's policy was an inflammatory statement by a convicted killer-but, ironically,
that statement was uttered in open court prior to sentencing; it was not the killer's last words. In
justifying their policy, Ohio prison officials pointed to the 1996 California sentencing of
Richard Allen Davis for the murder of 12-year-old Polly Klass. Davis, afforded the traditional
privilege to speak before sentencing, used the opportunity to make the outrageous suggestion
that the dead girl's father had molested her. Thomas Suddes, Death Row Bill Restricts Last
Words, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 26, 2000, at 4B.
73. Nolan, supra note 29.
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text if it is potentially offensive. 74 Ohio abandoned this policy only after
being sued by the American Civil Liberties Union.75 Pursuant to a
settlement of that suit, Ohio's policy was rewritten to incorporate an
affirmative right to last words.
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. For Centuries, Anglo-American Tradition Has
Afforded Condemned Prisoners the Freedom to Utter Their
Last Words When Standing on the Brink of Execution.
In an unbroken tradition that stretches back at least 500 years,
condemned prisoners in Anglo-American culture have been afforded the
privilege to make a last dying speech, free from state censorship, in the
moments before their execution. 76
Visible as early as 1388, 77 the privilege was consistently honored at
English executions throughout the sixteenth century. Scaffold speeches
were delivered by Sir Thomas More78 and John Fisher 79 at their executions
in 1535; by Anne Boleyn in 1536;80 by Thomas Cromwell in 1541;81 by the
Duke of Somerset in 1551;82 by Edward Seymour in 1552;83 by Lady Jane
Grey in 1553;84 by John Felton in 1570;85 by the Earl of Mortoun in 1581;86
74. Nolan, supra note 29.
75. See supra note 34.
76. GATRELL, supra note 8, at 36. See also JUSTIN ATHOLL, SHADOW OF THE GALLOWS 49
(1954); FRASER, supra note 3, at 229; THOMAS M. McDADE, THE ANNALS OF MURDER xxxii
(1961); PARRY, supra note 6, at 112.
77. 1 COBBETT'S, supra note 2, at 89, 118-19 (discussing the trial of Nicholas Brambre
(Parliament 1388)).
78. Id. at 385, 395-96 (discussing the trial of Sir Thomas More (K.B. 1535)). Though the
King willed that More's scaffold speech be brief, he was allowed to give one. PETER ACKROYD,
THE LIFE OF THOMAS MORE 405 (1998).
79. 1 COBBETT'S, supra note 2, at 395, 406-08 (discussing the trial of John Fisher (K.B.
1535)).
80. PARRY, supra note 6, at 132-33; BRYAN, supra note 6, at 79.
81. 1 COBBETT'S, supra note 2, at 433, 437-38 (discussing the trial of Thomas Cromwell
(KB. 1541)).
82. Id. at 515, 523-24 (discussing the trial of Edward, Duke of Somerset (K.B. 1551)).
83. HERBERT LOCKYER, ALL THE LAST WORDS OF SAINTS AND SINNERS 91 (1969).
84. 1 COBBETT'S, supra note 2, at 715, 728-30 (discussing the trial of Lady Jane Grey
(Q.B. 1553)).
85. Id. at 1085, 1085-88 (discussing the trial of John Felton (Q.B. 1570)).
86. Id. at 947, 952-53 (discussing the trial of James, Earl of Mortoun (Q.B. 1581)).
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and by Edward Abington87 and Mary Queen of Scots 88 at their executions in
1586. By 1606, with the execution of Guy Fawkes and his co-conspirators
in the Gunpowder Plot, the privilege to make a dying speech was already
well established in England. 89 On this side of the Atlantic, the privilege had
taken root by the mid-1600s.9° It was afforded to a British spy, executed by
order of General George Washington during the Revolutionary War. 91
The privilege was extended to everyone: from kings,92 queens,93 and
aristocrats, 94 to the lowest of the low 9 5-even to prisoners of war96 and
those convicted of treason. 97  The most hated criminals were allowed to
87. Id. at 1141, 1156-60 (discussing the trial of Edward Abington (Q.B. 1586)).
88. Id. at 1161, 1210 (discussing the trial of Mary, Queen of Scots (Q.B. 1586)).
89. FRASER, supra note 3, at 231-34, 265.
90. At their hangings on Boston Common in 1659 and 1660, three Quaker missionaries
were given the privilege to utter their last words. DRIMMER, supra note 1, at 138-39. Last
words were also afforded George Burroughs, executed in Massachusetts for witchcraft in 1692.
Id. at 142. And the privilege was extended to a murderer executed in Boston in 1726. Id. at
135.
91. DRIMMER, supra note 1, at 147-50; LOSSING, supra note 1, at 105.
92. Executed in 1649, King Charles I of England gave a long speech from the scaffold.
KAINES, supra note 5, at 62-65.
93. Anne Boleyn, executed in 1536: BRYAN, supra note 6, at 79; KAINES, supra note 5, at
37. Mary Queen of Scots, executed in 1586: 1 COBBETT'S, supra note 2, at 1161, 1210.
94. 1 COBBETT'S, supra note 2, at 515, 523-24 (discussing the trial of Edward, Duke of
Somerset (K.B. 1551)); id. at 947, 952-53 (discussing the trial of James, Earl of Mortoun (Q.B.
1581)); id at 1333, 1359-60 (discussing the trial of Robert, Earl of Essex (House of Lords
1600)); 7 COBBETT'S, supra note 7, at 1293, 1564-68 (discussing the trial of William, Viscount
Stafford (House of Lords 1680)); 9 COBBETT'S, supra note 7, at 577, 683-84 (discussing trial
of William, Lord Russell (K.B. 1683)).
95. GATRELL, supra note 8, at 8, 34-35, 439.
96. Nathan Hale, captured by British troops and executed in New York City in 1776,
delivered a scaffold speech that is justifiably famous; he declared: "I only regret that I have but
one life to lose for my country." DRIMMER, supra note 1, at 145-46; HENRY PHELPS JOHNSTON,
NATHAN HALE 1776: BIOGRAPHY AND MEMORIALS 128-29 (1914); LOSSING, supra note 1, at
23. A British prisoner of war, John Andre, was afforded the same privilege to deliver a scaffold
speech when executed under orders from General George Washington in 1780. DRIMMER,
supra note 1, at 147-50; LOSSINq supra note 1, at 105. Even the Nazis convicted of war crimes
at the Nuremberg Trial were afforded the privilege to deliver a last dying speech in the moments
before they were hanged. See JOSEPH E. PERSICO, NUREMBERG: INFAMY ON TRIAL 425-27
(1994).
97. 1 COBBETT'S, supra note 2, at 385, 395-96 (discussing the trial of Sir Thomas More
(K.B. 1535)); id. at 395, 406-08 (discussing the trial of John Fisher (K.B. 1535)); id. at 433,
437-38 (discussing the trial of Thomas Cromwell (K.B. 1541)); id. at 715, 728-30 (discussing
the trial of Lady Jane Grey (Q.B. 1553)); id.at 1141, 1156-60 (discussing the trial of Edward
Abington (Q.B. 1586)); id. at 1409, 1414-16 (discussing the trial of Sir Christopher Blunt (Q.B.
1600)); 2 COBBETT'S COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 1, 40-45 (London, R. Bagshaw
1809) [hereinafter 2 COBBETT'S] (discussing the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh (K.B. 1603))
(though tried in 1603, Raleigh languished in the Tower of London until his scaffold speech and
beheading in 1618); 5 COBBETT'S COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 1008, 1230-37
1172 [Ariz. St. L.J.
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deliver a dying speech, 98 including the assassins of Presidents Lincoln, 99
Garfield,'00 and McKinley. l0 l Individuals conspicuously bereft of most
rights were nevertheless afforded their last words. The privilege was
extended, for example, to Nat Turner, a black slave who led an 1831 revolt
in which fifty-five whites were shot, beheaded, or hacked to death. 1 02 Even
a Tennessee lynch mob saw fit to afford its victim the right to deliver a last
dying speech. 103
(London, R. Bagshaw 1810) (discussing the trial of Thomas Harrison (K.B. 1660)). The
privilege to deliver a dying speech was extended to each of the Gunpowder Plot conspirators
when they were hanged in 1606. FRASER, supra note 3, at 231-34, 265. William Laud,
Archbishop of Canterbury, was impeached in 1640 on grounds of "popery" and treason. WILL
& ARIEL DURANT, THE AGE OF REASON BEGINS 208 (1961). Upon his execution in 1645, id. at
214, Laud was afforded a last dying speech from the scaffold. 1 BULSTRODE WHITELOCK,
MEMORIALS OF THE ENGLISH AFFAIRS 364 (Oxford 1853).
98. Confederate Captain Henry Wirz, commandant of the notorious Andersonville prison,
was afforded last words when executed by federal troops in 1865. DRIMMER, supra note 1, at
164-65. Likewise afforded last words were the anarchists Sacco and Vanzetti, executed in
1927. Id. at 34-36. The "Molly Maguires," radical labor activists who waged war against coal
mine owners in Pennsylvania, were afforded last words when executed in 1877. 1d. at 186-88;
AUGUST MENCKEN, BY THE NECK: A BOOK OF HANGINGS 98-108 (1942).
99. Last words were afforded the conspirators in the Lincoln assassination, who, surviving
John Wilkes Booth, were hanged en masse in 1865. DRIMMER, supra note 1, at 186-88;
MENCKEN, supra note 98, at 137-38.
100. President James A. Garfield's assassin, Charles Julius Guiteau, was afforded last
words when executed in 1882. DRIMMER, supra note 1, at 188-93; MENCKEN, supra note 98, at
81-90.
101. President William McKinley's assassin, Leon Czolgosz, was afforded last words when
executed in 1901. DRIMMER, supra note 1, at 193-95.
102. DRIMMER, supra note 1, at 152-54.
103. MARK CURRIDEN & LEROY PHILLIPS, JR., CONTEMPT OF COURT: THE TURN-OF-THE-
CENTURY LYNCHING THAT LAUNCHED 100 YEARS OF FEDERALISM 212-13 (1999) (relating
eyewitness accounts of a lynching on March 19, 1906 in Chattanooga, Tennessee).
What is striking about this privilege is just how infrequently it was denied or curtailed. In stark
contrast to the overwhelming number of times that last words were fully afforded, our research has
uncovered only a handful of instances where it was not. At an 1875 triple hanging in New York,
one of the three prisoners 'begged' to be allowed to 'say a few words before he died."' The deputy
sheriff rejected his request. Michael Madow, Forbidden Spectacle: Executions, the Public and the
Press in Nineteenth Century New York, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 461, 527 (1995). Perhaps it is no
coincidence that these three prisoners were black. Id. at 527-28. Even so, there is evidence that
blacks were delivering long scaffold speeches in upstate New York in the late nineteenth century,
see id. at 528 n.294, which makes the foregoing incident all the more an aberration. Indeed, our
research has uncovered only one other significant example of the privilege being flatly denied: Ruy
Lopez, a Portuguese Jew who had served as Queen Elizabeth's physician, was convicted of
conspiracy in a Spanish plot to assassinate the Queen. He was strung up before being given a
chance to address the crowd in June 1594. PARRY, supra note 6, at 122-23. Equally few and far
between are those instances where last words were cut short rather than denied altogether. History
affords only two significant examples. The first involves Sir Thomas More, executed in 1535.
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The freedom to communicate one's last words was a freedom not just to
speak, but to speak offensively, even seditiously:
On the scaffold likewise, custom had long entitled the condemned
to address the crowd as they pleased, seditiously if they chose.
Although every effort was made to force them to public
professions of guilt and penitence, they were not checked if they
betrayed that role. Jacobites had betrayed the role spectacularly,
some making seditious speeches "plainly calculated," as Dudley
Ryder had observed, "for nothing else but to incense the people
against the government ... ." In 1791 d'Archenholz reported the
English belief that "humanity requires that such an alleviation
should be permitted to one who is about to be launched out of the
world by a violent death." 104
The dying speeches of two presidential assassins, Charles Julius Guiteau
and Leon Czolgosz, were famously offensive and seditious. Guiteau,
executed in 1882 for killing President James A. Garfield, used his scaffold
speech to proclaim: "This nation will go down in blood.. . . My murderers,
from the Executive to the hangman, will go to hell."'10 5 Czolgosz, executed
in 1901 for shooting President William McKinley, used his dying speech to
declare: "I killed the President because he was an enemy of the good
people-of the working people. I'm not sorry for my crime."'6
The privilege to utter one's last words was a freedom not just to speak
but to be heard.l0 7 The spectators who attended an execution came with a
keen interest in hearing what the condemned would say. 108 The scaffold
Though the King willed that his scaffold speech be brief, he was allowed to give one. ACKROYD,
supra note 78, at 405; JAMES MONTI, THE KING'S GOOD SERVANT BUT GOD'S FIRST: M-E LIFE AND
WRITINGS OF SAINT THOMAS MORE 449 (1997); THOMAS STAPLETON, THE LIFE AND ILLUSTRIOUS
MARTYRDOM OF SIR THOMAS MORE 188-89 (Philip E. Hallett trans., 1928) (1966). Finally, at the
1887 mass hanging of the Haymarket defendants in Chicago, the prisoners began to address the
crowd after the nooses had been placed around their necks. Their exhortations were brutally
curtailed-in mid-sentence-when the executioner sprang the trap door beneath their feet. AVRICH,
supra note 23, at 393; DAVID, supra note 23, at 463.
104. GATRELL, supra note 8, at 36 (quoting, respectively, THE DIARY OF DUDLEY RYDER,
1715-1716 at 336 (W. Matthews ed., 1939) and J. D'ARCHENHOLZ, A PICTURE OF ENGLAND:
CONTAINING A DESCRIPTION OF THE LAWS, CUSTOMS, AND MANNERS OF ENGLAND 148
(1791)).
105. DRIMMER, supra note 1, at 191.
106. Id. at 194-95.
107. GATRELL, supra note 8, at 355 ("The meanings of executions depended on [what the
condemned might say with his last words]. Every ear strained to hear them.").
108. Id. at 89 (describing the customs of the scaffold crowd: "the hope that the victim might
speak and the straining to hear (death spoke, after all)"); accord JOHN D. BESSLER, DEATH IN
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speech served as a communication to the citizenry and as an opportunity for
the condemned to place a stamp of individuality on his death. 109
Although encouraged to be penitent' 0-- and many prisoners obligingly
delivered cautionary tales of a life gone astray' --4he condemned was free
to reject that role."l2 Indeed, he was at liberty to use his scaffold speech for
any message he desired:
In his scaffold speech in particular, the condemned man had a
wide range of options: he could confess his guilt or protest his
innocence, mock or bless authority, forgive or curse his judges and
executioners, blame or exculpate his parents. He could seek the
sympathy and support of the crowd, excoriate enemies,
incriminate confederates, or simply prolong his life a few extra
minutes. 113
Sir Walter Raleigh turned his scaffold speech into a point-by-point
refutation of the charges against him. 114 James Ings, one of the Cato Street
Conspirators," l5 employed his last words to challenge the legitimacy of the
government. 116 A nineteenth century New Yorker used his dying speech to
THE DARK: MIDNIGHT EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA 23 (1997); Barry Faulk, The Public Execution:
Urban Rhetoric and Victorian Crowds, in EXECUTIONS AND THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE FROM THE
17TH TO THE 20TH CENTURY: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS (William B. Thesing ed., 1990) at 79-
80; Donald T. Siebert, The Aesthetic Execution of Charles I Clarendon to Hume, in
EXECUTIONS AND THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE FROM THE 17TH TO THE 20TH CENTURY: A
COLLECTION OF ESSAYS (William B. Thesing ed., 1990) at 8.
109. Madow, supra note 103, at 483.
110. ATHOLL, supra note 76, at 56-57; BESSLER, supra note 108, at 26; Madow, supra
note 103, at 483.
111. ATHOLL, supra note 76, at 56; BESSLER, supra note 108, at 26-28; HOWARD ENGEL,
LORD HIGH EXECUTIONER: AN UNASHAMED LOOK AT HANGMEN, HEADSMEN, AND THEIR
KIND 25 (1996); Madow, supra note 103, at 471-72.
112. ATHOLL, supra note 76, at 62-63; BESSLER, supra note 108, at 29; ENGEL, supra
note 111, at 26; PETER LINEBAUGH, THE LONDON HANGED: CRIME AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY280 (1992); Madow, supra note 103, at 483.
113. Madow, supra note 103, at 484.
114. 2 COBBE-r's, supra note 97, at 1, 40-45 (discussing the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh
(K.B. 1603)); STEPHEN COOTE, A PLAY OF PASSION: THE LIFE OF SIR WALTER RALEIGH 376
(1993); CONSTANCE FECHER, THE LAST ELIZABETHAN: A PORTRAIT OF SIR WALTER RALEIGH
230 (1972); ROBERT LACEY, SIR WALTER RALEIGH 379-81 (1973); PARRY, supra note 6, at
130-31; WILLIAM STEBBING, SIR WALTERRALEIGH: A BIOGRAPHY 376-78 (Oxford, Clarendon
Press 1972) (1899).
115. The Cato Street Conspirators were executed in London in 1820 for attempting to
assassinate the entire Cabinet. See MENCKEN, supra note 98, at 235.
116. As he stood atop the scaffold, Ings exclaimed: "Remember I die the enemy of tyranny
and would sooner die in chains than live in slavery." MENCKEN, supra note 98, at 238. English
history features many dying speeches that likewise contained political messages. Hanbury
Price, hanged in Birmingham in 1828, used his scaffold speech to call the government a
murderer. GATRELL, supra note 8, at 34. Executed in London in 1825, Edward Harris used his
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accuse the government's witnesses of perjury. 117 And at the dawn of the
twenty-first century,. many, prisoners devote their last words to a
condemnation of capital punishment itself. "18
Remarkably, the state exerted no editorial control over the condemned's
message and allowed it to be delivered spontaneously, without any advance
review." 9 Nor did the state do much to limit the duration of the prisoner's
speech. 12  A dying declamation might 'last forty-five minutes;"' one
prisoner, executed in Utah in 1859, went on speaking for four hours. 1
22
At the turn of the century, when executions were moved behind prison
walls,2 3 the dying speech grew shorter and less theatrical, 24 but the
tradition did not die. Time and time again throughout the intervening years,
prisoners at "private" executions have uttered a dying ,speech to the
assembled witnesses.125  Since those witnesses invariably include
last words to criticize the laws and the sheriff. GATRELL, supra note 8, at 439. At his
beheading in 1641, see DURANT, supra note 97, at 210, Thomas Wentworth, Earl of Strafford,
delivered a dying speech in which he suggested that it was better for England to be ruled by
Parliament than the crown. PARRY, supra note 6, at 135.
117. See Madow, supra note 103, at 526 n.284.
118. See generally supra note 21; MARK GROSSMAN, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 147-48 (1998).
119. GATRELL, supra note 8, at 36; Madow, supra note 103, at 483-85. See generally
Thomas W. Laqueur, Crowds, Carnival and the State in English Executions, 1604-1868, in THE
FIRST MODERN SOCIETY 309 (A.L. Beier et al. eds., 1989) (arguing that public executions, far
from being a potent theatrical expression of state power, were highly unpredictable, dominated
by a camivalesque atmosphere, and reflected great freedom on the part of spectators and
prisoners alike).
120. Madow, supra note 103, at 484 ("And whatever the condemned man chose to say, he
could be fairly confident that no one would intervene to stop him, at least not for a while.").
Describing a London execution in 1664, Samuel Pepys recalled that the prisoner "delayed the
proceedings 'by long discourses and prayers one after another, in hopes of a reprieve."'
GATRELL, supra note 8, at 244 (quoting 5 THE DIARY OF SAMUEL PEPYS 23 (Robert Latham &
William Matthews eds., 1971) (1964). Executed in Washington, D.C. in 1882, President
Garfield's assassin, Charles Julius Guiteau, was given an extended opportunity to speak from
the scaffold. He read from the Bible, prayed aloud, took turns weeping and declaiming, and
finally read a self-serving poem he had written for the occasion. DRIMMER, supra note 1, at 191;
MENCKEN, supra note 98, at 81-89. At an 1849 hanging in New York, the condemned man
asked to speak a second time after the hood had already been drawn over his face. The
executioner granted his request. Madow, supra note 103, at 526 n.286.
121. DRIMMER, supra note 1, at 246.
122. Id. at 245.
123. In England, public executions ceased in 1868. BESSLER, supra note 108, at 33;
DRIMMER, supra note 1, at 136. In the United States, the switch from public to private
executions was underway by the mid-nineteenth century, DRIMMER at 134, but the last public
execution did not take place until 1937, id. at 136.
124. Madow, supra note 103, at 526.
125. Last words were afforded at each of the following executions, all of which took place
behind prison walls: murderer Thomas Durrant, executed at San Quentin in 1898, MENCKEN,
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representatives of the news media, 126 the condemned is still afforded a
conduit by which to address the citizenry-just as he did in centuries past
when they crowded around the scaffold to hear his parting words12 or
purchased the pamphlets that printed them. 128
The essence of that tradition is the privilege to make a spontaneous,
unedited speech with one's dying breath. 129. Indeed, these were the very
qualities that riveted the crowd's attention when the prisoner began to
speak. 130 And if he could rise to the occasion, such a platform gave the
speaker a unique opportunity to inspire. For radical labor leader William D.
Haywood, the last words of August Spies were a galvanizing moment in his
life. 131 Shouting from the scaffold as the Haymarket Defendants were fitted
with nooses, Spies declared: "The time will come when our silence will be
more powerful than the voices you strangle today. ' 132  Those words,
recalled Haywood, were "a turning point in my life." 133 He went on to form
and lead the Industrial Workers of the World.134
Having surveyed the pertinent history, this Article has shown that current
policies restricting last words would stamp out a privilege that condemned
prisoners have enjoyed for at least 500 years. The privilege afforded Anne
Boleyn in 1536,135 invoked by Sir Walter Raleigh in 1618,136 and extended
supra note 98, at 42-43; William Kemmler, the first man to die in the electric chair, executed at
Sing Sing in 1890, DRIMMER, supra note 1, at 6; Sacco and Vanzetti, executed in Massachusetts
in 1927, id. at 34-36; the Clutter murderers, who prompted Truman Capote to write IN COLD
BLOOD, executed in Kansas in 1965, id. at 178-79; and Charlie Brooks, the first prisoner to die
by lethal injection, id. at 74.
126. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2949.25(A)(7) (1997) (authorizing the attendance
of media representatives at executions).
127. GATRELL, supra note 8, at 89, 355.
128. ATHOLL, supra note 76, at 56; BESSLER, supra note 108, at 23; DAVID D. COOPER, TlIE
LESSON OF THE SCAFFOLD 23-26 (1974).
129. GATRELL, supra note 8, at 36; Madow, supra note 103, at 483-85.
130. See Madow, supra note 103, at 484 ("[T]he mere possibility that a condemned man,
with 'nothing more to lose,' might 'curse the judges, the laws, the government and religion'
probably supplied much of the dramatic suspense of these occasions.") (quoting MICHEL
FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 60 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977)
(1975)).
131. AVRICH, supra note 23, at 434. Spies was one of four anarchist leaders hanged in
Chicago in 1887. Id. at xi, 260-93.
132. Id. at 434; DAVID, supra note 23, at 463.
133. AVRICH, supra note 23, at 434 (footnote omitted).
134. Id. See generally PETER CARLSON, ROUGHNECK: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF BIG BILL
HAYWOOD (1983) (recounting Haywood's founding and leadership of the IWW); JOSEPH R-
CONLIN, BIG BILL HAYWOOD AND THE RADICAL UNION MOVEMENT (1969) (same); MELVYN
DUBOFSKY, 'BIG BILL' HAYWOOD (1987) (same).
135. PARRY, supra note 6, at 132-33; BRYAN, supra note 6, at 79.
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by General George Washington. to a British spy in 1780137 is the same
privilege consistently honored today in Texas. 138  When a privilege has
existed for so long; when it has crossed the Atlantic and taken root in our
soil; when it has survived revolution, civil war, and the social upheavals of
half a millenium, that privilege may safely be deemed a legal right. Indeed,
how many of our established rights can claim the same lineage in history
and tradition?
B. The Right ofAllocution as a Compelling Parallel
If our courts are at all reluctant to recognize such a right, they need look
no further than the right of allocution--the right to speak before one is
sentenced. 139 Like last words, allocution originated as a privilege, emerging
from early English tradition. 140 Like last words, allocution extends to
criminal defendants, affording them an opportunity to be heard. Like last
words, allocution arises in the moments just before a final disposition of the
case. And, like last words, allocution rests upon a lineage that goes back
hundreds of years.14' Early English authors like Hale, 142 Blackstone, 143 and
Chitty' 44 refer to allocution as a mandatory and well-established component
136. 2 COBBETr's, supra note 97, at 1, 40-45 (discussing the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh
(K.B. 1603)); COOTE, supra note 114, at 376; FECHER, supra note 114, at 230; LACEY, supra
note 114, at 379-81; PARRY, supra note 6, at 130-31; STEBBING,.supra note 114, at 376-78.
137. DRIMMER, supra note 1, at 147-50.
138. See Executed Offenders Website, supra note 13.
139. United States v. De Alba Pagan, 33 F.3d 125, 129 (1st Cir. 1994) ("The right of
allocution affords a criminal defendant the opportunity to make a final plea to the judge on his
own behalf prior to sentencing."); see WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ET AL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 26.4(g) at 1231 (3d ed. 2000) (defining the right of allocution, acknowledging its common law
origins, and briefly describing its current recognition under state and federal law); Caren Myers,
Encouraging Allocution at Capital Sentencing: A Proposal for Use Immunity, 97 COLUM. L.
REV. 787, 798-99 (1997) (briefly summarizing the nature and history of allocution).
140. See Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304 (1961) (plurality opinion) (Frankfurter,
J.) (tracing our modem recognition of the right of allocution to English common law cases from
the seventeenth century). The right of allocution was extended to the Gunpowder Plot
conspirators in 1605. See FRASER, supra note 3, at 224-25.
141. See De Alba Pagan, 33 F.3d at 129 ("Ancient in law, allocution is both a rite and a
right."). See generally Paul W. Barrett, Allocution, 9 MO. L. REV. 115, 116-24 (1944)
(retracing the ancient common law roots of allocution).
142. 2 SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORYOF THE PLEAS OF THE CROwN 401 (photo. reprint
1971) (1736).
143. 4 SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 368 (photo.
reprint 1979) (1769).
144. 1 JOSEPH CHITTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 699-700 (photo.
reprint 1978) (1816). Chitty observes that:
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of criminal trials. As far back as the sixteenth century, English tribunals
were honoring the privilege to speak before sentencing. 145 As early as
1689, English courts had recognized that a judge's failure to ask the
defendant if he had anything to say in the moments before sentencing
required reversal. 146
Those deep historical roots prompted the United States Supreme Court to
recognize an affirmative right of allocution. 147 That right is now expressly
protected by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 148 and federal circuit
courts consistently treat the violation of that right as reversible error. 149
Holding that the right of allocution must be afforded the defendant
personally and that it will not suffice merely to invite an address by counsel,
the Supreme Court observed: "The most persuasive counsel may not be
Before judgment is pronounced upon the defendant . . . [i]t is now
indispensably necessary... that the defendant should be asked by the clerk if
he has any thing to say why judgment of death should not be pronounced on
him; and it is material that this appear upon the record to have been done;
and its omission after judgment in high treason will be a sufficient ground for
the reversal of the attainder.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
145. E.g., 1 COBBETT'S, supra note 2, at 1141, 1154-55 (discussing the trial of Edward
Abington (Q.B. 1586)).
146. Anonymous, 87 Eng. Rep. 175, 175 (K.B. 1689); The King v. Geary, 91 Eng. Rep.
532, 532-33 (K.B. 1689); accord The King v. Speke, 91 Eng. Rep. 872, 872 (K.B. 1694).
Defense counsel in the Geary case recalled that he had asserted four assignments of error, the
fourth being that his client had been denied the right of allocution prior to sentencing. The
King's Bench reversed the judgment because "[a]ll held the last to be a fatal exception." The
King v. Geary, 89 Eng. Rep. 495, 495 (K.B. 1689).
147. Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304 (1961) (plurality opinion) (Frankfurter, J.)
(recognizing a right of allocution under American law that is traceable to English common law
precedent from the seventeenth century); accord Boardman v. Estelle, 957 F.2d 1523, 1530 (9th
Cir. 1992) (holding that allocution "is a right guaranteed by the due process clause of the
Constitution"); United States v. Jackson, 923 F.2d 1494, 1496 (11 th Cir. 1991) ("A defendant is
entitled to be present when his sentence is imposed, and this right to be present and speak is
constitutionally based.") (citations omitted); Ashe v. North Carolina, 586 F.2d 334, 336 (4th
Cir. 1978) ("Petitioners contend that refusal of a defendant's request to speak to the sentencing
court constitutes a denial of due process under the fourteenth amendment, and we agree."); cf
Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496, 501-04 (1972) (holding that contempt proceedings by
Wisconsin state legislature violated the 14th Amendment's Due Process Clause by denying the
contemnor his right of allocution).
148. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(3)(C) (specifying that "[b]efore imposing sentence, the court
must... address the defendant personally and determine whether the defendant wishes to make
a statement and to present any information in mitigation of the sentence"). At the state level,
allocution "is recognized in most jurisdictions by court rule or statute and in some states by the
state constitution." LAFAVE ET AL, supra note 139, § 26.4(g) at 1231.
149. See, e.g., United States v. De Alba Pagan, 33 F.3d 125, 129-30 (1st Cir. 1994); United
States v. Adams, 252 F.3d 276, 289 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Myers, 150 F.3d 459, 463
(5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Riascos-Suarez, 73 F.3d 616, 627 (6th Cir. 1996); United
States v. Patterson, 128 F.3d 1259, 1261 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).
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able to speak for a defendant as the defendant might, with halting
eloquence, speak for himself." 50 That observation applies with equal force
to a condemned prisoner's last words.'
51
Given the striking similarities between allocution and last words, there is
no principled reason for denying one while recognizing the other. Our
courts, following the path laid down in the allocution precedents, should not
hesiiate to recognize an affirmative right to utter one's last words in the
moments before being executed.
IV. ANALYSIS: APPLYING THE FIRST AMENDMENT To REGULATIONS THAT
RESTRICT A CONDEMNED PRISONER'S LAST WORDS
This Article discusses a constitutional question of first impression. No
judicial decision has come to our attention addressing the government's
power to restrict the last words of a condemned prisoner. 5 2 No court has
ever decided whether there exists a First Amendment "right" to utter one's
last words free from state censorship. Though such a right has yet to be
recognized, the strongest basis for any right is whether it has been honored
from time immemorial' 5 3-and this is certainly true of the privilege to make
a last dying speech. For centuries, Anglo-American historical tradition has
afforded the condemned a consistent privilege to address the spectators at
150. Green, 365 U.S. at 304.
151. Indeed, the allocution statements of the Branch Davidian defendants, available at
http://www.cia.com.au//serendipity/waco/allocut.htm (last visited July 10, 2001), are
remarkably similar to death chamber utterances where prisoners profess their innocence. E.g.,
supra note 16. In both situations, the speaker expresses outrage at governmental misconduct in a
uniquely personal address that no other speaker and no other medium could ever equal.
152. The constitutional challenge to Ohio's restriction on last words, Treesh v. Taft, No. C-
2-99-624 (S.D. Ohio filed July 6, 1999), never produced a decision on the First Amendment
merits. Though the case did generate two published opinions, both focused on procedural issues
and neither reached the substantive First Amendment question posed by the challenge. See
Treeshv. Taft, 122 F. Supp. 2d 881 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (rejecting mootness and ripeness defenses
asserted by the government); Treesh v. Taft, 122 F. Supp. 2d 887 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (addressing
a prisoner's duty to exhaust administrative remedies under § 7(a) of the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)). Ohio abandoned the challenged policy in April 2001,
Johnson, supra note *, and the case was settled in September 2001. Wendling, supra note 29.
153. In Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939), where the Supreme Court first recognized
an affirmative right to use streets, sidewalks, and public parks for assembly and debate on
public issues, Justice Roberts observed:
[Streets and parks] have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the
public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.
Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part
of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.
Id. at 515.
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his execution-a privilege not just to speak but to speak offensively, even
seditiously. '54 It would be difficult to imagine a speech right with deeper
historical roots. Accordingly, this Article will perform an original intent
analysis, 155 arguing that the privilege to utter a dying speech was more
firmly established by 1791 than most, if not all, of the expressive freedoms
recognized today.
Before delving into original intent, this section of the Article will
proceed as follows. It will begin with "first principles,' 56 examining the
censorship of last words in terms of the basic reasons that our law protects
free expression. Then, it will demonstrate that the restrictive policies 157
outlined in Section II of this Article are vulnerable to challenge under a
variety of First Amendment doctrines:
Prior Restraint. 158 In two different respects, these policies operate as
unconstitutional prior restraints. They do so, first, by giving the warden
advance review and approval power over the prisoner's statement. Such
power is akin to the vesting of unfettered discretion in a licensing
official-a power that the First Amendment flatly forbids. Second, these
policies operate in advance to silence the prisoner at the very end of his life,
foreclosing any spontaneous communication of the unique thoughts and
feelings that may occur to him as he stands on the brink of extermination.
Content-Based Discrimination 159 To the extent that these policies are
designed to shield witnesses from unpleasant remarks by condemned
prisoners, they should be struck down under the strict scrutiny reserved for
content-based restrictions on speech. Ohio, for example, adopted its policy
because of the communicative impact of potential statements by condemned
prisoners 1 -and that is the very definition of a content-based restriction.
Public Forum Doctrine. 161 Since these policies restrict expressive access
to publicly owned property, they are governed by the public forum doctrine.
Under any of the three prongs of public forum analysis--governing
traditional, designated, or nonpublic fora--these policies are vulnerable to
154. See GATRELL, supra note 104 and accompanying text.
155. See infra Section IV.G.
156. See infra Section IV.A.
157. When referring to "restrictive" policies, the analysis section of this Article is focusing
on the policies that either bar a condemned prisoner from uttering a last dying speech inside the
execution chamber (Pennsylvania, Illinois, North Carolina, South Carolina, and, until recently,
Ohio, supra notes 25-29) or cause those statements to be made outside the presence or beyond
the hearing of the spectators (Maryland, Virginia, California, and Nevada, supra notes 30-33).
158. See infra Section IV.B.
159. See infra Section IV.C.
160. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
161. See infra Section IV.D.
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First Amendment challenge. Through centuries of history and public
custom, the gallows 62 has served as a traditional--or, at the very least, a
designated-public forum. To the extent that these policies are aimed at
suppressing last words that are "offensive" or unpleasant, they should be
struck down under the strict scrutiny that governs content-based restrictions
in traditional or designated public fora. Even if the gallows is deemed a
nonpublic forum, these policies violate the First Amendment by imposing
viewpoint-based restrictions on such a forum. Finally, even if they are
deemed content-neutral, these policies flunk the narrow tailoring and ample
alternative channels requirements by blocking access to a unique and
precious forum: the irreplaceable opportunity to communicate the thoughts
and feelings that surface in the final moments of one's life.
Overbreadth. 163  These policies run afoul of the overbreadth doctrine
because, in their effort to suppress a tiny fraction of dying speeches (the
very few that feature spiteful or profane remarks to the victim's family),
they deny to all prisoners the opportunity to speak from the brink of death.
Prisoner Speech Cases. 164 Finally, Supreme Court decisions employing
a deferential standard to uphold restrictions on prisoner speech are
inapplicable here because none of them involved a form of expression
honored by Anglo-American governments since the sixteenth century.
A. First Principles: To Censor Last Words is to Contradict Our
Basic Reasons for Protecting Free Expression
The first layer of analysis proceeds from first principles: Restricting the
last words of a condemned prisoner is inconsistent with the basic reasons
that Anglo-American law protects free expression.
What are the reasons for protecting speech? 165 Scholars have
identified, 166 and Supreme Court decisions reflect, 167 three distinct
162. For the sake of convenience, I use the word "gallows" here to refer to the many forms
(e.g., scaffold, gibbet, gas chamber, etc.) that execution sites have taken in our history.
163. See infra Section ME.
164. See infra Section IV.F.
165. For excellent surveys of the scholarly debate on this question, see GERALD GUNTHER
& KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1025-29 (13th ed. 1997) [hereinafter
GUNTHER & SULLIVAN], and GEOFFREY R. STONE, LOUIS M. SEIDMAN, CASS R. SUNSTEIN &
MARK V. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 998-1004 (4th ed. 2001) [hereinafter STONE
SEIDMAN].
166. See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-7 (1970);
RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 6-17 (1992); see also Edward J.
Bloustein, The Origin, Validity, and Interrelationships of the Political Values Served by
Freedom of Expression, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 372, 395 (1981) (identifying three interdependent
values supporting a theory of the First Amendment in a democratic state: the "attainment of
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justifications: (1) a search-for-truth rationale, which holds that knowledge
is best obtained through the clash of rival viewpoints in an unrestricted
"marketplace of ideas"; (2) a self-governance rationale, which holds that
responsive government and enlightened public policy are best achieved
through unfettered political debate; and (3) a self-fulfillment rationale,
which holds that expressive freedom is a necessary aspect of individual
dignity, autonomy, and self-realization.
The search-for-truth rationale is often traced to John Stuart Mill,'68 but it
found eloquent expression even earlier, in the writings of Thomas
knowledge," the "consensual participation in government," and the "dignity of self-
expression").
167. Though the Court has invoked these justifications in a sporadic and sometimes
overlapping manner, each of the three rationales has appeared at pivotal moments in First
Amendment history. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)
(invoking the search-for-truth rationale) ("The First Amendment, said Judge Learned Hand,
'presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues,
than through any kind of authoritative selection. To many this is, and always will be, folly; but
we have staked upon it our all."') (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362,
372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)); Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (invoking the self-
governance rationale) ("[I]t is only through free debate and free exchange of ideas that
government remains responsive to the will of the people and peaceful change is effected.");
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (invoking a combination of the self-governance and
self-fulfillment rationales):
The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a society
as diverse and populous as ours. It is designed and intended to remove gov-
ernmental restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision
as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in the
hope that use of such freedom will ultimately produce a more capable
citizenry and more perfect polity and in the belief that no other approach
would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which
our political system rests.
Id. at 24.
All three rationales are eloquently combined in the seminal concurrence by Justice Brandeis in
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927):
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the state was
to make men free to develop their faculties .... They believed that freedom
to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the
discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech and assembly
discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily
adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the
greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a
political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the
American government.
Id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
168. See JOHN STUARTMILL, ON LIBERTY 18 (David Spitz ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 1975)
(1859):
[T]he peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is
robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those
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Jefferson. 169 Its first Supreme Court proponent was Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., whose seminal dissent in Abrams v. United States70 introduced
the "marketplace of ideas" as a justification for protecting free expression:
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the
very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon
which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is
the theory of our Constitution. 
171
Thus, the search-for-truth rationale is based upon the notion-the
implausible notion, some critics assert' 72--that good ideas will prevail over
bad ideas when juxtaposed in the marketplace of public opinion. 173 Such a
who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it.. If the
opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for
truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer
perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with
error.
Id.
Scholars tracing the search-for-truth rationale to Mill include: MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 46 (1984); ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, THE POVERTY OF
LIBERALISM 11-12 (1968); C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25
UCLA L. REV. 964, 968 n.9 (1978).
169. As Jefferson observed, "[Tihe public judgment will correct false reasonings and
opinions, on a full hearing of all parties." SAUL K. PADOVER, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE
FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 132 (1965) (quoting second inaugural address). See also
Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 n.3 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (quoting Jefferson's first inaugural
address) ("If there be any among us who would wish to dissolve this union or change its
republican form, let them stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which error of
opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it.").
170. 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (upholding Sedition Act convictions of six defendants who, in
opposition to U.S. military intervention against the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, printed and
distributed leaflets in New York City denouncing the incursion, advocating solidarity with
Russian workers, and urging that production of ordnance and ammunition be curtailed).
171. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
172. See, e.g., Harry H. Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 YALE L.J. 1105, 1130
(1979) ("It .is naive to think that truth will always prevail over falsehood in a free and open
encounterfor too many false ideas have captured the imagination of man."); id. at 1130 ("In the
long run, true ideas tend to drive out false ones. The problem is that the short run may be very
long ...."); Baker, supra note 168, at 974-81 (identifying flaws in the "marketplace of ideas"
rationale-including its tendency to favor society's presently dominant groups and its erroneous
assumption that public opinion is shaped solely by rational, and not also by emotional, appeals).
173. The "marketplace of ideas" theory was described with great precision by one of its
harshest critics:
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view leaves the government largely powerless to restrict access to that
market; rather than acting as a content-conscious gatekeeper, the state must
acquiesce in "the dissemination of noxious doctrine,"'17 4 even in "the
expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with
death."' 175 Since the clash of competing viewpoints is the path to truth,
176
"the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones.' '177 Fallacies are to be
exposed through "more speech, not enforced silence."'' 7 8 This search-for-
truth rationale supports a prominent feature of First Amendment
jurisprudence: the Supreme Court's hostility to content-based regulation. 179
Competition among ideas strengthens the truth and roots out error; the
repeated effort to defend one's convictions serves to keep their justification
alive in our minds and guards against the twin dangers of falsehood and
fanaticism; to stifle a voice is to deprive mankind of its message, which, we
must acknowledge, might possibly be more true than our own deeply held
convictions . . . . Just as an unfettered competition among commodities
guarantees that the good products sell while the bad gather dust on the shelf,
so in the intellectual marketplace the several competing ideas will be tested
by us, the consumers, and the best of them will be purchased.
WOLFF, supra note 168, at 11-12.
174. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
175. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
176. As Justice William 0. Douglas so forcefully observed:
[A] function of free speech under our system of government is to invite
dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a
condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or
even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It
may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling
effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of speech
[is accorded heightened protection] . . . . For the alternative would lead to
standardization of ideas either by legislatures, courts, or dominant political or
community groups.
Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4-5.
177. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
178. Id. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
179. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (setting aside breach-of-the-peace
conviction of defendant, a Jehovah's Witness, who, in the course of his sidewalk proselytizing,
incensed passers-by in playing a phonograph record that expressed anti-Catholic sentiments).
As Justice Douglas observed:
In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief, sharp differences
arise. In both fields the tenets of one man may seem the rankest error to his
neighbor. To persuade others to his own point of view, the pleader ... at
times, resorts to exaggeration, to vilification.., and even to false statement.
But the people of this nation have ordained in the light of history, that, in
spite of the probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the long
view, essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the
citizens of a democracy.
Id. at 310; accord Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (permitting the
regulation of "fighting" words, and thus departing from the heightened scrutiny normally
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Another influential justification for protecting speech is the self-
governance rationale, which holds that unfettered political debate is
essential to achieving responsive government and enlightened public
policy.' 80 Supreme Court decisions evince great respect for this rationale' 81
and consistently describe political speech as occupying "the core" of First
Amendment protection. 182 The self-governance rationale has four distinct
themes. 183  First, democratic self-rule entails a process of collective
decision-making that requires an informed citizenry; this deliberative
process functions best in an atmosphere of unfiltered debate, where the
body politic is exposed to every perspective on a given issue. '84 Second,
reserved for content-based regulations, only because such statements "are no essential part of
any exposition of ideas" and are of only "slight social value as a step to truth").
180. Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 301-06 (1992). The self-
governance rationale is traceable all the way back to James Madison's Virginia Report of 1799.
See 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 575 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Philadelphia, Lippincott 1836).
181. See, e.g., Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24 ("The constitutional right of free expression ... is
designed and intended to remove governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion,
putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in the
hope that use of such freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more
perfect polity .... "); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) ("[T]here is practically
universal agreement that a major purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free
discussion of governmental affairs.").
182. E.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334, 346 (1995) (describing
political speech as 'bccup [ying] the core of the protection afforded by the First Amendment").
183. GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 165, at 1027.
184. The classic articulation of this theme comes from Alexander Meiklejohn:
When men govern themselves, it is they-and no one else-who must pass
judgment upon unwisdom and unfairness and danger. And that means that
unwise ideas must have a hearing as well as wise ones, unfair as well as fair,
dangerous as well as safe, un-American as well as American. Just so far as,
at any point, the citizens who are to decide an issue are denied acquaintance
with information or opinion or doubt or disbelief or criticism which is
relevant to that issue, just so far the result must be ill-considered, ill-balanced
planning for the general good. It is that mutilation of the thinking process of
the community against which the First Amendment . . . is directed. The
principle of the freedom of speech springs from the necessities of the
program of self-government .... It is a deduction from the basic American
agreement that public issues shall be decided by universal suffrage.
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 26-27
(1948).
This theme is echoed in Supreme Court decisions construing the First Amendment.
Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("Freedom to think as you will and to speak
as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth."); New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) ("A profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it
may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government
and public officials."); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) ("[The First
1186 [Ariz. St. L.J.
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unfettered discourse on public affairs prevents the entrenchment of
government power and clears the path to political change.' 85  Third,
unrestricted speech serves as a check on the abuse of power by public
officials. 186 Fourth and finally, free speech promotes political stability by
affording a safety valve for dissent. 187
Though it supplies a strong basis for protecting speech on public affairs,
the self-governance rationale offers only meager support for protecting art
and literature.188 Creative expression is embraced, however, by the last of
the principal justifications for protecting speech: a self-fulfillment rationale,
which holds that expressive freedom is a necessary aspect of individual
dignity, autonomy, and self-realization. 189 Under this rationale, it is not just
Amendment] was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of
political and social changes desired by the people."); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15
(1976) ("Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral
to the operation of the system of government established by our Constitution .... In a republic
where the people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed choices among
candidates for office is essential ....").
185. Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4 ("[I]t is only through free debate and free exchange of ideas
that government remains responsive to the will of the people and peaceful change is effected.");
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) ("The maintenance of the opportunity for
free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people
and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security of
the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system."); see JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 112 (1980) (in a chapter entitled "Clearing the Channels of Political
Change," Ely describes the "central function" of the First Amendment as "assuring an open
political dialogue and process").
186. Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 521, 527 (stressing "the value that free speech ... can serve in checking the abuse of
power by public officials").
187. EMERSON, supra note 166, at 7 ("[T]he process of open discussion promotes greater
cohesion in a society because people are more ready to accept decisions that go against them if
they have a part in the decision-making process."); accord Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis,
J., concurring) ("[The Framers] knew that order cannot be secured merely through fear of
punishment for its infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope, and imagination;
that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government;
[and] that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and
proposed remedies .... ").
188. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Book Review, 62 HARV. L. REV. 891, 899-900 (1949)
(criticizing Meiklejohn's self-governance rationale as failing to afford speech protection for
such non-political expression as scholarship, art, and literature). But see Alexander Meiklejohn,
The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REv. 245, 255-57 (responding to Chafee's
criticism by expanding his conception of "political" speech to include artistic and literary
expression). See also Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems,
47 IND. L.J. 1, 26-28 (1971) (arguing for a sharply circumscribed view of the First Amendment
as protecting only a narrowly-defined sphere of political speech); CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 6-7 (1993) (arguing against limiting speech
protection to purely political expression).
189. The best articulation of this rationale comes from David A. J. Richards:
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political speech but all forms of self-expression that warrant constitutional
protection. 190 Broad intellectual freedom--to communicate, to inquire, to
create-is a concomitant to political freedom191 and a precondition to
realizing one's full human potential. 92
The search-for-truth and self-governance rationales offer strong support
for unfettered speech on the death penalty--and many condemned prisoners
use their last words as a plea for abolishing state executions. 193 Such a plea,
coming from a person whose own life is about to be taken, is uniquely
capable of grabbing public attention and changing public sentiment. Thus,
policies that restrict spontaneous, brink-of-death speeches by condemned
[Pleople are not to be constrained to communicate or not to communicate, to
believe or not to believe, to associate or not to associate. The value placed on
this cluster of ideas derives from the notion of self-respect that comes from a
mature person's full and untrammelled exercise of capacities central to human
rationality. Thus, the significance of free expression rests on the central human
capacity to create and express symbolic systems, such as speech, writing,
pictures, and music . . . . Freedom of expression permits and encourages the
exercise of these capacities .... In so doing, it nurtures and sustains the self-
respect of the mature person.
The value of free expression, in this view, rests on its deep relation to self-
respect arising from autonomous self-determination without which the life of the
spirit is meager and slavish.
David A. J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law. Toward a Moral Theory of the First
Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 45, 62 (1974) (footnote omitted); accord Martin H. Redish, The
Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 601 (1982) [hereinafter The Value of Free
Speech] (arguing for a theory of free speech far broader than the Bork/Meiklejohn view,
extending beyond self-governance to "individual self-realization"); id. at 604 ("[T]he very
exercise of one's freedom to speak, write, create, appreciate, or learn represents a use, and
therefore a development, of an individual's uniquely human faculties.").
This self-fulfillment rationale occasionally surfaces in Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g.,
Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("Those who won our independence
believed that the final end of the State was to make men free to develop their faculties .... ");
Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24 (observing that the constitutional right of free expression "put[s] the
decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us ... in the belief
that no other approach would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon
which our political system rests").
190. The Value of Free Speech, supra note 189, at 604 ("[Tlhe appropriate scope of the
[F]irst [A]mendment protection is much broader than Bork or Meiklejohn would have it. Free
speech aids all life-affecting decisionmaking, no matter how personally limited, in much the
same manner in which it aids the political process . . . . There thus is no logical basis for
distinguishing the role speech plays in the political process.").
191. Id. at 601 ("[Our nation adopted] a democratic system [because of] an implicit belief
in the worth of the individual that has [F]irst [A]mendment implications extending well beyond
the borders of the political world. Indeed, political democracy is merely a means b---or, in
another sense, a logical outgrowth of-the much broader value of individual self-realization.").
192. See Richards, supra note 189, at 62; accord Brian C. Murchison, Speech and the Self-
Realization Value, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 443 (1998).
193. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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prisoners offend the search-for-truth and self-governance rationales by
eliminating the most riveting form of death penalty criticism. '94
Whether our government should have the power to take a person's life is
a moral and political question that eminently deserves public debate. It is a
question that implicates the search-for-truth rationale because it poses a
stark and difficult choice, it is deeply divisive, and it cries out for thoughtful
resolution. It is a question that implicates the self-governance rationale
because it involves a matter of public policy and requires society to decide
how much power we will cede to our government. Thus, two prominent
rationales supporting free expression combine to suggest that speech on the
death penalty should be utterly unfettered.
Many condemned prisoners use their last words to criticize the death
penalty. A Georgia prisoner concluded his dying speech by declaring, "I
pray that one day this country, which is supposed to be civilized, will
abolish barbaric acts such as this death penalty."'' 95 A Texas prisoner used
his last words to assert, "This is premeditated murder by the appointed
district attorney and the State of Texas." 196 Another Texas prisoner used his
dying speech to say, "I hope that one day we can look back on the evil that
we're doing now [and view it] like the witches we burned at the stake."' 197
Because they emanate from a person who stands on the brink of
extermination, these utterances are more likely to influence public opinion
than any billboard, banner, or editorial. No other condemnation of capital
punishment is as likely to resonate in people's minds, because in no other
context is the message linked with the messenger's death. But these
utterances cannot reach the public if prison officials prohibit dying
speeches. Thus, prison policies that disallow a traditional dying speech
leave the public unexposed to a form of death penalty protest that is more
likely than any other to command their attention. To eliminate the most
194. The search-for-truth and self-governance rationales are implicated by many other
messages that prisoners choose to convey with their last words. Many prisoners use their dying
speech to criticize the government, see supra note 116, to criticize the justice system, see supra
note 22, or to express solidarity with a political movement or cause, see supra note 23.
195. Montgomery, supra note 14.
196. Last Words of Some of the 99 Executed in Texas Since 1982, supra note 21. This
theme-that capital punishment is institutionalized murder by the state-surfaces again and
again in the dying speeches of condemned prisoners. "Remember," said Texas inmate Robert
Nelson Drew at his 1994 execution, "the death penalty is murder." Executed Offenders Website,
supra note 13. Hanbury Price, hanged in England in 1828, used his scaffold speech to declare
that the government was committing murder. GATRELL, supra note 8, at 34. Gary Graham,
executed in Texas in 2000, used his dying speech to describe the justice system as perpetuating
the institutionalized "lynching" of impoverished blacks. Executed Offenders Website, supra
note 13.
197. Executed Qffenders Website, supra note 13.
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riveting form of death penalty criticism is to contradict the search-for-truth
and self-governance rationales by skewing the debate on capital
punishment. In the words of Alexander Meiklejohn:
Just so far as, at any point, the citizens who are to decide an issue
are denied acquaintance with information or opinion or doubt or
disbelief or criticism which is relevant to that issue, just so far the
result must be ill-considered, ill-balanced planning for the general
good. It is -that mutilation of the thinking process of the
community against which the First Amendment... is directed.198
In addition to the search-for-truth and self-governance rationales, the
self-fulfillment rationale likewise supports a First Amendment right to
deliver a dying speech. The self-fulfillment rationale holds that expressive
freedom is a necessary aspect of individual dignity, autonomy, and self-
realization.'" This rationale is offended by policies that silence a prisoner
as he stands on the brink of death--because such policies, by sending the
prisoner to a muffled and anonymous end, serve to squelch his humanity
and individuality. Their effect--and, undoubtedly, their design-is to
throw a blanket over the fact that the government is killing a person here.
What better way to anesthetize public perception that a human life is being
taken than to bar the prisoner from placing a stamp of individuality on the
proceedings? And the best way to accomplish that objective is to prevent
the prisoner from speaking:
To allow the condemned to speak in the moments before his death
is to acknowledge his individual existence, to confer a unique,
personal identity upon him that prompts others more clearly to
perceive that a person is in fact dying. Such perceptions can be
inhibited by prohibiting speech, especially a speech. 200
Arguing, then, from first principles, we see that restrictions on last words
contradict the basic reasons that our law protects freedom of expression.
Each of the three principal rationales supporting free speech--the search-
for-truth rationale, the self-governance rationale, and the self-fulfillment
rationale-is offended by policies that prohibit a traditional dying speech.
198. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 184, at 26.
199. See Richards, supra note 189.
200. John Lofland, The Dramaturgy of State Executions, in STATE EXECUTIONS VIEWED
HISTORICALLY AND SOCIOLOGICALLY 281 (Patterson Smith 1977).
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B. Prior Restraint Analysis
These restrictive policies run afoul of the prior restraint doctrine in two
different respects. First, by giving the warden advance review and approval
power over the prisoner's written statement (as was attempted, at least, in
Ohio),2 °1 the policies offend the "unfettered discretion" prong of prior
restraint precedent. 202 Second, by foreclosing in advance any spontaneous
brink-of-death utterances by condemned prisoners, the policies offend even
Sir William Blackstone's narrow conception of expressive freedom. 203
1. The Warden's Advance Review and Approval Power as
a Fatal Flaw
In reaction to the now-vilified press licensing systems of the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, 2°4 the doctrine of prior restraint imposes severe
limits on the power of government to regulate speech before it is uttered or
published. Any regulatory scheme that subjects expression to advance
editorial review and approval flatly constitutes a prior restraint. 20 5  Any
prior restraint that vests "unbridled discretion" in the reviewing official
"will not be tolerated. ' '206
Courts have consistently invalidated permit schemes vesting government
officials with unfettered discretion to forbid or allow certain speech
activities27--striking down discretionary limits on parades20 8  and
201. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
202. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 225-26 (1990) (identifying "two
evils" in speech licensing schemes "that will not be tolerated": (1) vesting "unbridled
discretion" in the licensing authority, and (2) 'fail[ing] to place limits on the time within which
the decisionmaker must issue the license").
203. In 1769, Blackstone observed: "The liberty of the press . . . consists in laying no
previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when
published." 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 143, at 151-52.
204. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (striking down a licensing scheme that
restricted the distribution of literature in public places-requiring written permission from, and
vesting unfettered discretion in, the city manager); id. at 451-52 (invoking the English
experience with press licensing, and Milton's protest against it, in asserting that a principal aim
of the First Amendment was to free public expression from the prior restraint of a licensor).
205. Id. at 451-52.
206. FW/PBS, Inc., 493 U.S. at 225-26. This expository account of the prior restraint
doctrine is derived from a fuller treatment that appears in one of my earlier articles. See Kevin
Francis O'Neill, A First Amendment Compass: Navigating the Speech Clause with a Five-Step
Analytical Framework, 29 Sw. U. L. REv. 223, 270-77 (2000).
207. See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988)
(discussing a permit to place newsracks on public property); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v.
Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (discussing a permit to use city auditorium).
208. E.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
33:1159] 1191
HeinOnline  -- 33 Ariz. St. L.J. 1191 2001
ARIZONA STATE LA WJOURNAL S
demonstrations, 2 9 sidewalk preaching 2 0 and leafleting, 211 rallies in public
parks,212 and the use of sound amplification equipment.213 Any scheme that
vests arbitrary discretion in the licensing official "has the potential for
becoming a means of suppressing a particular point of view."
214
Recall that when Ohio adopted its last words policy, prison officials
asserted that the warden would enjoy "complete editorial rights" over the
prisoner's statement,215 with unfettered discretion to change it, cut it,
summarize it, or censor it altogether.21 6 When reviewing the condemned's
written statement, they said, the warden would scan it for any passage that
is "potentially offensive," and, upon finding such a passage, would send the
statement back to the prisoner with instructions to change it. 2 17 Should the
prisoner refuse, the warden "will have discretion to [censor] that part of the
statement--or the entire text if it is potentially offensive. 2 8
Such a policy, vesting unfettered editorial discretion in the warden, is
utterly inconsistent with the prior restraint precedents set forth above. By
subjecting speech--and not any speech, by the way, but a 500-year-old
tradition of expressive freedom--to this sort of editorial meddling, the
policy offends the First Amendment.
2. Foreclosing Near-Death Communication as a Fatal Flaw
The policies that bar or disable the oral communication of last words
from inside the death chamber-even if they allow some sort of written
statement to be submitted beforehand---constitute a prior restraint on
speech. This is because they operate in advance to silence the prisoner at
the very end of his life. That moment-that existential precipice, that
climax-is qualitatively different from any other moment we experience. It
is certainly different from the comparative tranquility that the prisoner
experiences in his cell. Who is to say that the difference between those
situations will not produce differences in the content of a prisoner's last
words? What a prisoner might write in the isolation of his cell six hours
209. E.g., Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
210. E.g., Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951).
211. E.g., Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
212. E.g., Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951).
213. E.g., Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
214. Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 649 (1981).
215. Last Words Will Be Posthumous, supra note 29.
216. No Last Words, supra note 29; Ohio to Stifle Last Words, supra note 29; Last Words
Will Be Posthumous, supra note 29.
217. Nolan, supra note 29.
218. Id.
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before the execution will likely be a far cry from the torrent of thoughts and
feelings that surge inside him as he stands on the brink of extermination.
To silence him at that moment---and to kill him in the next--is to cut off his
only chance to communicate those special thoughts and feelings.
Thus, these policies foreclose in advance an entire category of speech,
and thereby offend even Blackstone's narrow conception of expressive
freedom as liberty solely from prior restraint.219
C. Content-Neutrality Analysis
What unites these restrictive policies is the effort to filter or sanitize the
prisoner's last words--to make them palatable to the victim's family and,
by extension, to the public. The aim of the Ohio policy, remember, was to
shield the friends and relatives of murder victims from "potentially spiteful,
profane, or abusive remarks" by those condemned to die. 220 If that is the
purpose behind these policies, then they are content-based (indeed,
viewpoint-based) restrictions on expression. By its own admission, Ohio
adopted its policy because of the communicative impact of potential
statements by condemned prisoners-and that is the very definition of a
content-based restriction.
"It is axiomatic," the Supreme Court has stressed, "that the government
may not regulate speech based on its substantive content or the message it
,,221 222conveys. Content-based restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny. In
gauging content-neutrality, the controlling factor is the government's
purpose or intent. 223  A restriction will be deemed content-based if the
government is regulating speech because of its communicative impact, 224 or
22out of disagreement with the message it conveys. 25 Indeed,
"[d]iscrimination against speech because of its message is presumed to be
unconstitutional. 226 When government targets not subject matter but, even
219. See supra note 203.
220. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
221. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995);
see also O'Neill, supra note 206, at 235-38 (offering an expository account of content-
neutrality analysis).
222. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761 (1995). To
survive judicial review under strict scrutiny, the speech restriction must be "necessary, and
narrowly drawn, to serve a compelling state interest." Id.
223. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
224. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988).
225. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.
226. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828; accord Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622,
641 (1994).
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more narrowly, particular views on a given subject, the First Amendment
violation "is all the more blatant."22 7 "Viewpoint discrimination is thus an
egregious form of content discrimination. '228  Accordingly, "the
government must abstain from regulating speech when the specific
motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the
rationale for the restriction."
' 229
Here, the government's purpose--according to its own public
statements-is to suppress particular meanings, to silence particular
sentiments.2 0 The prisoner is barred from delivering a spontaneous,
unedited speech out of fear that he will say the wrong thing, out of fear that
the witnesses will be wounded or disturbed by his message. Thus, Ohio's
policy (and, by extension, the other restrictive policies identified in Section
II, even if their promulgation did not produce an Ohio-type smoking gun) is
presumptively unconstitutional as a viewpoint-based restriction, or, at the
very least, is subject to strict scrutiny as a content-based restriction.
D. Public Forum Analysis
Access to public property for speech-related activity is governed by the
public forum doctrine. 231 Since the execution chamber is a publicly-owned
space, and since the question here involves speech access to that space, the
instant policies implicate the public forum doctrine by restricting the
expressive use of that space. Under any of the three prongs of public forum
analysis--governing traditional, designated, or nonpublic fora-these
policies violate the First Amendment. Through centuries of history and
public custom, the gallows has served as a traditional--or, at the very least,
a designated--public forum. To the extent that these policies are aimed at
suppressing last words that are "offensive" or unpleasant, they should be
struck down under the strict scrutiny that governs content-based restrictions
in traditional or designated public fora. Even if the gallows is deemed a
nonpublic forum, these policies violate the First Amendment by imposing
viewpoint-based 232 restrictions on such a forum. Finally, even if they are
227. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
231. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761 (1995); see
O'Neill, supra note 206, at 284-89 (offering an expository account of the public forum
doctrine).
232. See supra Section IV.C (establishing that these restrictive policies are, at the very
least, content-based---and, given their preoccupation with silencing offensive last words, are
more appropriately regarded as viewpoint-based).
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deemed content-neutral, these policies flunk the narrow tailoring and ample
alternative channels requirements by blocking access to a unique and
precious forum: the irreplaceable opportunity to communicate the thoughts
and feelings that surface in the final moments of one's life.
Before elaborating these arguments, we should begin with the black-
letter principles of the public forum doctrine. The Supreme Court has
adopted a "forum-based" approach to assessing speech restrictions that the
government seeks to place on the use of its property. 233 Government-owned
property has been divided into three categories. for purposes of forum
analysis: (1) "traditional" public fora; (2) "designated" public fora; and (3)
"nonpublic" fora, the last category comprising all of the government
property not embraced within the first two. 
234
Traditional public fora are places that "by long tradition or by
government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate' 235-including,
for example, such areas as public streets, parks, and sidewalks. 236
Designated public fora are places that the government "has opened for
expressive activity by part or all of the public" 23 7-including, for example,
university meeting facilities238 and municipal theaters. 239 Nonpublic fora
are places that, by tradition, nature, or design, "are not appropriate
platforms for unrestrained communication ' ,24° -including, for example,
military installations 24' and federal office buildings.2
42
In forum analysis, the government's power to impose speech restrictions
depends on how the affected property is categorized; the level of judicial
scrutiny hinges on whether the property is deemed a traditional, designated,
or nonpublic forum.243 Traditional public fora "may be regulated only via
content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions." 2 " Governmental
restrictions on the content of public forum speech are presumptively
unconstitutional; 245 they will be struck down unless shown to be "necessary,
and narrowly drawn, to serve a compelling state interest. ' 2 46 These same
233. See Int'l. Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992).
234. Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 678-79.
235. Perry Educ. Ass'nv. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
236. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985).
237. Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 678.
238. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
239. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
240. Paulsen v. County of Nassau, 925 F.2d 65, 69 (2d Cir. 1991).
241. United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675 (1985).
242. See United States v. Sachs, 679 F.2d 1015 (1st Cir. 1982).
243. Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 678-79.
244. Paulsen, 925 F.2d at 69.
245. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995).
246. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 761.
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standards govern the second category: restrictions on speech in designated
public fora.247 Though the government may limit access to certain speakers
(for example, student groups) 248 or certain subjects (for example, school
board business), 249 and though it need not keep such a forum open
indefinitely, 250 its restrictions must be applied evenhandedly to all similarly
situated parties. 251 Judicial scrutiny is substantially relaxed vis-a-vis the
third category: restrictions on speech in nonpublic fora.252  A
reasonableness standard generally prevails here, but the government may
not impose viewpoint-based restrictions.253
1. The Death Chamber as a Traditional Public Forum
This Article has painstakingly demonstrated that the gallows has served
for centuries as a singular forum for expression.254 Throughout the
sixteenth century---at a time when speech and press were subject to
ferocious restrictions 255-- prisoners were consistently afforded the freedom
to deliver a scaffold speech.256 That freedom, visible in England as early as
1388,257 was being honored here in America more than a century before the
First Amendment's adoption.258 The freedom afforded Guy Fawkes and the
Gunpowder Plot conspirators in 1606259 is the same freedom consistently
honored today at executions in Texas,260 Florida,26' and Louisiana.262 This
247. Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 678; Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800; Perry, 460 U.S.
at 46.
248. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
249. See City of Madison Joint School Dist. v. Wisconsin Pub. Employment Relations
Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976).
250. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
251. Id. at 45-46, 48.
252. See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 730 (1990).
253. See id.
254. See supra Section III.A.
255. For example, in 1579, the right hand of an author was chopped off as punishment for
his written attack on the proposed marriage between Queen Elizabeth and the Duke of Anjou.
FREDRICK SEATON SIEBERT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN ENGLAND 91-92 (1965). In 1603, at the
end of Elizabeth's reign, a printer was hanged, drawn, and quartered for publishing a book that
opposed the ascension of James I to the throne. NAT HENTOFF, THE FIRST FREEDOM 57 (1980).
256. See supra notes 77-89 and accompanying text.
257. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
258. One sees the privilege being honored at a hanging on Boston Common in 1659-more
than 100 years before the First Amendment's ratification in 1791. DRIMMER, supra note 1, at
138-39.
259. FRASER, supra note 3, at 229-34, 265.
260. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
261. See supra note 50.
262. See supra note 51.
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expressive tradition is so deeply ingrained in our history and culture that we
may safely deem the gallows a traditional public forum. Indeed, the
gallows qualifies as a traditional public forum even under the restrictive
standard enunciated by Chief Justice Rehnquist in International Society for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee.263
In Krishna Consciousness, the Chief Justice held that airport terminals
are nonpublic fora because they are modem and therefore cannot fit the
classic description of streets, parks, and sidewalks announced in Hague v.
CIO264 as "immemorially . . . time out of mind" 265 devoted to public
266discourse. Moreover, he concluded, airports cannot be deemed
traditional public fora because their principal purpose is not to promote the
free exchange of ideas.267 Thus, the Chief Justice substantially narrowed
the concept of the public forum by transforming Hague's descriptions of
streets, parks, and sidewalks into prerequisites that must be satisfied in
order to qualify for traditional public forum status.268 Writing separately,
Justice Kennedy complained that this heavy emphasis on historical tradition
"leaves almost no scope for the development of new public forums." 269
But even the restrictive analysis employed by the Chief Justice cannot
deprive the gallows of its rightful status as a traditional public forum. No
less than streets, parks, and sidewalks, the gallows has served
"immemorially ... time out of mind' 270 as a platform for free expression.
This Article has demonstrated that the expressive traditions surrounding the
gallows are as old as they are rich,27 1 stretching back at least 500 years2 72
and embracing even seditious speech2 73 long before comparable expression
was afforded any meaningful protection by the Supreme Court.274 Indeed,
given the great age of the gallows as a rostrum for individual expression,
and given its consistent use as a medium for communicating with the
263. 505 U.S. 672 (1992).
264. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
265. Id. at 515.
266. Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 680 (1981).
267. Id. at 680-81.
268. Id. at 683.
269. 1d. at 695 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
270. Hague, 307 U.S. at 515.
271. See supra Section III.A.
272. Traceable to 1388, the privilege was consistently honored at English executions
throughout the 1500s. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
273. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
274. It was not until the mid-20th century that the Supreme Court developed significant
protections for speech. E.g., Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (inaugurating
the development of the hostile audience precedents and affording meaningful protection for
provocative speech). By contrast, the tradition of seditious scaffold speeches is traceable,
conservatively, back to the 1700s. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
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public, it qualifies even more readily than streets and sidewalks as a
traditional public forum under the Rehnquist standard. As Justice Kennedy
observed, the "principal purpose of streets and sidewalks... is to facilitate
transportation, not public discourse."275 By contrast, the gallows really has
served-literally--as a platform for speech making. Though it functions,
certainly, as a killing apparatus, it is used just as frequently as a stage for
oratory--and this sets it apart from streets and sidewalks, which are used
only occasionally for expressive activities. Historically, the scaffold speech
was as much a part of the spectacle as the killing that followed it. 276 The
spectators who attended an execution came with a keen interest in hearing
what the condemned would say.277 Thus, given its historical function as a
platform for speech making, the gallows readily qualifies as a traditional
public forum.
Since the gallows is a traditional public forum; since, within such a
forum, content-based restrictions are presumptively unconstitutional; 278 and
since, as we have already shown, last words policies are content-restrictive
(indeed, viewpoint-restrictive),279 such policies are void as a matter of law.
2. The Death Chamber as a Designated Public Forum
Even if our courts reject the notion that the gallows is a traditional
public forum, it certainly satisfies the definition of a designated public
forum as one that the government "has opened for expressive activity.
2 80
Five hundred years of scaffold speeches did not happen by accident; such a
tradition could never have developed without the affirmative dedication of
the state. That type of purposeful cooperation, transcending many
governments and many eras, is more than enough to create a designated
public forum.
In divining the requisite intent to create a designated public forum, the
Court will look to the government's "policy and practice" vis-a-vis the
property; 281 it will likewise inquire whether the property is by nature
"compatib[le] with expressive activity." 282  As the Court observed in
Cornelius, "We will not find that a public forum has been created in the
275. Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 696-97 (1981)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
276. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
277. Id.
278. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995).
279. See supra Section IV.C.
280. Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 678.
281. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985).
282. Id.
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face of clear evidence of a contrary intent, nor will we infer that the
government intended to create a public forum when the nature of the
property is inconsistent with expressive activity. ' 28
3
Both of these factors-the government's policy and practice vis-a-vis the
property, and the property's free-speech compatibility-must be analyzed in
light of the centuries of tradition that this Article has charted. Over the
course of 500 years, Anglo-American governments have consistently
allowed condemned prisoners to make expressive use of the gallows. That
use, over and over again through the centuries, shows that the gallows are
perfectly compatible with expressive activity. As Justice Kennedy observed
in Krishna Consciousness, "[G]ovemment property of a type which by
history and tradition has been available for speech activity must continue to
be recognized as a public forum.''284 Thus, our courts should not hesitate to
treat the gallows as a designated public forum.
In designated (as in traditional) public fora, regulations that single out
particular messages for suppression are subject to strict scrutiny. 2 85 Since,
as we have already shown,286 the regulatory purpose here is to silence
certain messages, these policies are equally vulnerable to First Amendment
challenge if the gallows is deemed a designated public forum.
3. The Death Chamber as a Nonpublic Forum
Even if our courts conclude that the gallows should be deemed a
nonpublic forum, these policies are constitutionally suspect. Although a
reasonableness test normally governs nonpublic fora, the government may
not impose viewpoint-based restrictions there.287 Since (as prison officials
have publicly acknowledged 288) the very purpose of these policies is to
suppress particular messages, they constitute a viewpoint-based restriction
that is impermissible even in a nonpublic forum.
283. Id. at 803.
284. 505 U.S. at 698 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added).
285. 505 U.S. at 678-79.
286. See supra Section IV.C.
287. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 730 (1990).
288. See supra note 67-72 and accompanying text.
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4. Even if a Ban on Dying Speeches Were Somehow Deemed
Content-Neutral, It Would Flunk the Narrow Tailoring and
Ample Alternative Channels Requirements.
Finally, even if such a policy were to be deemed a content-neutral time,
place, and manner regulation, it would flunk the narrow tailoring and ample
alternative channels requirements by blocking access to a unique and
precious forum: the irreplaceable opportunity to communicate the thoughts
and feelings that surface in the final moments of one's life.
Time, place, and manner regulations are governed by a form of
intermediate scrutiny that has three distinct prongs. To survive judicial
review, such a regulation: (1) must be content-neutral (that is, it must be
justified by the government without reference to the content of the regulated
speech); (2) must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental
interest; and (3) must leave open ample alternative channels for
communicating the information.289 Merely for purposes of argument, we
are assuming here that the first prong-content-neutrality-has been
satisfied. An examination of the second and third prongs will reveal that an
outright ban on dying speeches cannot satisfy the narrow tailoring and
ample alternative channels requirements.
It must be admitted that the second prong-narrow tailoring-is by no
means stringently enforced. Indeed, the Supreme Court watered down this
requirement in Ward v. Rock Against Racism,29 stressing that time, place,
and manner regulations need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive
means of achieving the government's end; rather, "the requirement of
narrow tailoring is satisfied 'so long as the . . . regulation promotes a
substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively
absent the regulation.' 291 But regulations will fail this test if they choke
off particular forms of expressive activity-imposing, for example,
sweeping prohibitions on parades,292  demonstrations,293  residential
289. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); accord Clark v. Cmty. for
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177
(1983); see also O'Neill, supra note 206, at 239-43 (offering an expository account of time,
place, and manner analysis).
290. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
291. Ward, 491 U.S. at 798-99 (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689
(1985)).
292. E.g., Sixteenth of Sept. Planning Comm., Inc. v. City of Denver, 474 F. Supp. 1333
(D. Colo. 1979) (striking down, as impermissibly broad, a time, place, and manner restriction on
parades in downtown Denver; the regulation banned parades anywhere within the seven-square-
block central business district on all workdays from 7:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.).
293. E.g., United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 442 v. City of Valdosta, 861
F. Supp. 1570, 1580-81 (M.D. Ga. 1994) (striking down outright ban on public assemblies in all
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picketing,294 door-to-door leafleting, 29 or public .handbilling. A good
example is Bery v. City of New York,297 where the Second Circuit enjoined
enforcement of an ordinance that prohibited -visual artists from exhibiting or
selling their work in public places without a general vendor's license. The
court held that the ordinance was not narrowly tailored, but served instead
as "a defacto bar preventing visual artists from exhibiting and selling their
art in public areas of New York," because it placed an exceedingly low
ceiling on the number of available permits, creating a Waiting list so long
that even the City conceded that plaintiffs' prospects of securing a license
were nonexistent. 298
In each of these cases, the regulation was struck down because it
foreclosed an entire avenue of communication. And that is exactly the
effect of any prohibition on dying speeches-except that, in our context, the
injury is all the more irreparable because the speaker is silenced on the very
brink of death. He is deprived of the one and only chance to communicate
the unique thoughts and feelings that surge inside him at the culmination of
his life. An outright ban on parading or leafleting, while certainly
unconstitutional, can only pale in comparison. After all, the thwarted
speakers in those successful challenges remain alive, able to march or picket
or protest another day.
Prong three requires that the regulation must "'leave open ample
alternative channels for communicati[ng]' the speaker's message. 299  In
applying this requirement, it must be borne in mind that "one is not to have
the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on
the plea that it may be exercised in some other place." 3°° Though a speech
restriction may run afoul of this requirement if it precludes "forms of
public and quasi-public places other than parks--a prohibition that swept within its ambit all
demonstrations on streets, roads, highways, sidewalks, driveways, and alleys).
294. E.g., Kirkeby v. Furness, 52 F.3d 772 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that anti-abortion
protesters were entitled to preliminary injunction barring enforcement of a Fargo, North Dakota
ordinance that banned picketing within 200 feet of a residential dwelling and authorized year-
long, neighborhood-wide "no-picketing zones").
295. E.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (striking down outright ban on
all door-to-door leafletting).
296. E.g., Henderson v. Lujan, 964 F.2d 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (striking down---for lack of
narrow tailoring--a National Park Service regulation banning all leafletting on the sidewalks
surrounding the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, where the sidewalks, even at their closest, were
more than 100 feet from the Memorial's wall).
297. 97 F.3d 689 (2d Cir. 1996).
298. Id. at 697-98.
299. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (quoting Clark, 468 U.S. at 293).
300. Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939).
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expression that are much less expensive than feasible alternatives, ' '30 1 the
basic test for gauging the sufficiency of alternative channels is whether the
speaker is afforded "a forum that is accessible and where the intended
audience is expected to pass. 30 2 A speech restriction does not leave open
ample alternative channels if the speaker is left unable to reach the intended
audience.30 3 Thus, a restriction may be invalid if it deprives speakers of "a
uniquely valuable or important mode of communication,, 30 4 or if it
"threaten[s]" their "ability to communicate effectively. 30 5 These principles
are illustrated by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Movement, Inc. v. City of
Chicago.306 In that case, a civil rights organization sought to march through
a white neighborhood, its previous foray there having been curtailed when
bystanders pelted the procession with rocks, bricks, and explosive
devices.30 7 City officials denied plaintiffs a permit for a second march
through the same neighborhood, proposing instead an alternate route
through an all-black neighborhood.3 8 Since the whole point of plaintiffs'
march was to publicize and protest a pattern of violence against blacks
attempting to reside in or travel through the specified neighborhood, the
court held that the city's proposal for an alternate route-taking plaintiffs
away from that neighborhood and away from their intended audience-was
constitutionally inadequate as an alternative channel of communication. 30
301. Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789,
812 n.30 (1984); accord Bay Area Peace Navy v. United States, 914 F.2d 1224, 1229 n.3 (9th
Cir. 1990); City of Watseka v. Illinois Pub. Action Council, 796 F.2d 1547, 1558 (7th Cir.
1986), aff'd mem., 479 U.S. 1048 (1987); see, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141,
146 (1943) ("Door to door distribution of circulars is essential to the poorly financed causes of
little people."). But the Supreme Court has stressed that its "special solicitude" for inexpensive
forms of communication "has practical boundaries." Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 812
n.30 (citing Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88-89 (1949) ("That more people may be more
easily and cheaply reached by sound trucks ... is not enough to [insulate that method of
communication from regulatory restrictions] when easy means of publicity are open.") and
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 549-50 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting in
part) (ban on graffiti constitutionally permissible even though some creators of graffiti may
have no equally effective alternative means of public expression)).
302. Students Against Apartheid Coalition v. O'Neil, 660 F. Supp. 333, 339 (W.D. Va.
1987); accord Bay Area Peace Navy, 914 F.2d at 1229.
303. Bay Area Peace Navy, 914 F.2d at 1229; accord Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at
812 ("While the First Amendment does not guarantee the right to employ every conceivable
method of communication at all times and in all places, a restriction on expressive activity may
be invalid if the remaining modes of communication are inadequate.") (citations omitted).
304. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 812.
305. Id.
306. 419 F. Supp. 667 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
307. Id. at 672.
308. Id. at 672, 674.
309. Id. at 673-74.
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Application of this prong is likewise fatal to any prohibition on dying
speeches. While prison officials will insist that they can satisfy this
requirement by allowing the prisoner to write out his "last" words in his
cell, a brink-of-death utterance is qualitatively different from any other. To
block it is certainly to deprive the speaker of "a uniquely valuable or
important mode of communication," 310 and thus to offend the ample
alternative channels requirement. There is simply no substitute for speaking
at the very moment of one's demise; there is simply no existential
equivalent. Because that moment is so unique, it is all too likely that the
content of one's remarks will be different in the heart-pounding atmosphere
of the death chamber than they would be in the comparative calm of one's
cell. Accordingly, prohibitions on dying speeches flunk the ample
alternative channels requirement because there can never be a meaningful
alternative to one's last parting words.
E. Overbreadth Analysis
Last words policies run afoul of the overbreadth doctrine because, in
their effort to suppress a tiny fraction of dying speeches (the very few that
feature spiteful or profane remarks to the victim's family), they deny to all
prisoners the opportunity to speak from the brink of death.
The overbreadth doctrine may be invoked to strike down restrictions on
speech that are worded in such a way that even protected expression is left
vulnerable to punishment. 311 An excellent example of the doctrine is Board
of Airport Commissioners of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc.,312 where
the Supreme Court struck down, on overbreadth grounds, a regulation
prohibiting any person "to engage in First Amendment activities within the
Central Terminal Area at Los Angeles International Airport." 313 The Court
held that this regulation was fatally overbroad because "it prohibits even
310. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 812.
311. E.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (striking down-as facially
overbroad-provisions of the Communications Decency Act, a federal statute that criminalized
the Internet transmission of "indecent" materials to persons under the age of eighteen); id. at
874 ("In order to deny minors access to potentially harmful speech, the [Act] effectively
suppresses a large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive and to
address to one another."); City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987) (striking down--as
facially overbroad--an ordinance prohibiting speech that "in any manner" interrupts a police
officer in performing his duties; the ordinance was so broadly worded that it was violated every
day and effectively gave police un-fettered discretion to arrest individuals for words or conduct
that merely annoyed or offended them). See O'Neill, supra note 206, at 278-82 (offering an
expository account of the overbreadth doctrine).
312. 482 U.S. 569 (1987).
313. Id. at571.
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talking and reading, or the wearing of campaign buttons or symbolic
clothing,
314
Though a regulation must be "substantially" overbroad to be
invalidated,315 the total ban on death chamber speeches imposed by these
policies satisfies that test. Here the government is targeting those extremely
rare instances where prisoners are spiteful or abusive toward the victim's
family3 '6 -a fact pattern so rare that one does not find a single example of it
in the hundreds of executions conducted in Texas 317-but the government is
regulating the problem by taking away every inmate's right to utter a death
chamber speech. This would seem the very definition of "substantial"
overbreadth.
An example of how the Court applies the requirement of substantial
overbreadth is seen in New York v. Ferber,318 where it rejected an
overbreadth challenge to a statute that prohibited persons from knowingly
promoting a sexual performance by a child under the age of sixteen. While
recognizing that this statute might reach some protected expression (like
medical textbooks or pictorials in National Geographic), the Court
observed: "[W]e seriously doubt ...that these arguably impermissible
applications ... amount to more than a tiny fraction of the materials within
the statute's reach." 319 Thus, a statute will be deemed unconstitutionally
overbroad only when a substantial portion of the utterances within its reach
are protected by the First Amendment.320
Unlike Ferber, the vast majority of utterances barred by last words
policies are protected by the First Amendment. The Ferber statute targeted
child pornography, an utterly unprotected category of speech. In sharp
contrast, dying speeches almost never cross the line into unprotected
territory. They often feature protestations of innocence,321 lamentations of a
wasted life,322 expressions of apology to the victim's family, 323 or loving
good-byes to next of kin.324 Even if they did feature spiteful or abusive
statements, there is no good reason to suppose that such utterances are
314. Id. at 575.
315. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615-16 (1973).
316. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
317. The author has read the last words of every condemned prisoner executed in Texas
since 1982--and he has not found a single instance where the prisoner lashed out at the victim's
family. See Executed Offenders Website, supra note 13.
318. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
319. Id. at 773.
320. Id. at 771; Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 650-51 (1984).
321. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
322. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
323. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
324. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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unprotected.325 The unprotected category of "fighting words" requires an
immediate and personal invitation to fisticuffs 32 6-which is not something
that a condemned prisoner, strapped to a gurney behind thick glass walls, is
in any position to do. Likewise, the unprotected category of obscenity
327
would require a very different mise en scene. Ultimately, it is difficult even
to imagine a dying speech that would cross the line into unprotected
territory. How can the government survive an overbreadth challenge if it
cannot point to any unprotected speech lying at the center of its regulatory
target?
F. Restricted Environment Analysis
Supreme Court decisions upholding restrictions on prisoner speech do
not diminish the constitutional infirmity of these policies. Those
cases-involving efforts by prisoners to form a union, 328 to correspond with
inmates at other prisons, 329  or to hold face-to-face media
interviews33 0---cannot save these policies because, in sharp contrast to the
issue here, none of them involved a form of expression permitted by Anglo-
American governments since the sixteenth century.
In Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc.,33 1 the Supreme
Court upheld direct restrictions on efforts by prison inmates to form and
operate a union-including a ban on soliciting other inmates to join the
union, meetings among union members, and bulk mailings concerning the
union from outside sources. 332 Delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice
Rehnquist established an extremely deferential standard for gauging
restrictions on inmate speech. 333 Recognizing "the wide-ranging deference
325. If seditious statements fell within the tradition's protection as far back as the 1700s
(see GATRELL, supra note 8, at 36), how can spiteful or unpleasant remarks be deemed
unprotected now?
326. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989) (limiting the fighting words doctrine to "a
direct personal insult or an invitation to exchange fisticuffs"); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518,
524 (1972) (holding that, for the fighting words doctrine to apply, a statement must be
specifically and individually directed to a particular target); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,
20 (1971) (finding a provocative epithet insufficient for fighting words to apply and requiring a
more direct personal affront).
327. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
328. Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977).
329. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
330. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
331. 433 U.S. 119(1977).
332. Id.
333 Id.at 121-36.
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to be accorded the decisions of prison administrators,, 334 Rehnquist asserted
that "in the absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the
officials have exaggerated their response to [security] considerations, courts
should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such matters. 335 Justice
Marshall, in dissent, contended that the Court was effectively applying a
test that only inquired whether prison officials had exercised their judgment
in a rational manner. 36 In no other context, Marshall asserted, is the Court
this deferential.337
Ten years later, in Turner v. Safley,338 the Court upheld broad restrictions
on inmate-to-inmate correspondence-and, in the process, reaffirmed its
commitment to a deferential standard in prisoner speech cases. Announcing
a test that prevails to this day, 339 Justice O'Connor held that "when a prison
regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid
if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." 34  She
identified four factors to be considered in applying this standard: (1)
whether there exists a "valid, rational connection" between the regulation
and the governmental interest put forward to justify it; (2) whether inmates
are left with alternative means of exercising the right that the regulation
restricts; (3) whether accommodating the asserted right would have a
significant "ripple effect" on fellow inmates or prison staff; and (4) whether
there is a ready alternative to the regulation that fully accommodates the
asserted right at a de minimis cost to valid penological interests.341
Even applying the deferential standard from Turner, these policies are
constitutionally suspect. To begin with, the security concerns on which
Justice Rehnquist relied so heavily in Jones are simply not present here to
assist the government in establishing the requisite state interest. What
"security" concerns can possibly be present when an inmate is strapped to a
gurney, poised to receive a lethal injection? As for Turner's first prong,
there is no "valid, rational connection" 342 between these policies (which
deprive condemned prisoners of a 500-year-old privilege) and their
underlying justification (to prevent the remote343 possibility that a prisoner
334. Id. at 126.
335. Id. at 128 (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974)).
336. Id. at 141 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
337. Id.
338. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
339. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 404 (1989) (confirming that Turner
articulates the prevailing test); Altizer v. Deeds, 191 F.3d 540, 547-48 (4th Cir. 1999) (same).
340. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
341. Id. at 89-91.
342. Id. at 89 (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984)).
343. See supra notes 316-17 and accompanying text.
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might abuse the privilege). The opportunity to communicate one's life-
ending thoughts is simply too precious to be sacrificed so easily; it simply is
not rational to take so much away when the harm to be avoided is so
speculative. The inevitable result, per prong three, is to generate a
needlessly punitive ripple effect, silencing prisoners who would never have
used their last words to injure anyone. As for Turner's second and fourth
prongs, there is simply no substitute for delivering one's dying speech. As
this Article has already explained,344 nothing can replace that privilege
because the prisoner cannot possibly anticipate what will go through his
mind as he stands on the brink-and if he is silenced at that very moment,
he will never get the opportunity to express what he's feeling.
Thus, even when applying Turner's deferential standard, the instant
policies are vulnerable to challenge. On this score, the outcome in Turner is
more instructive than its test. Among the challenged regulations in Turner
was a provision that barred inmates from marrying other inmates or
civilians.345 Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor struck it down as
failing to satisfy her newly minted test. 4 What is revealing about her
analysis is the great respect she shows for the fundamental right to marry, 347
her impatience with corrections officials who argue that the right does not
apply to prisoners, 34 8 and her readiness to brush aside every "security
concern," "rehabilitation goal," and "penological objective[ ]" offered to
justify this restriction. 349 Her aggressive approach here stands in sharp
contrast to her deference to prison officials on the other challenged
provision: a restriction on inmate-to-inmate correspondence that she
upholds. 350 This contrast may be explained by the sharp difference between
the two underlying rights; in Justice O'Connor's eyes, the fundamental right
to marry is simply deserving of far more judicial respect than the ill-
supported inmate correspondence right.
This contrast suggests that Turner should not be applied in a deferential
manner to last words policies-because the underlying privilege is of
ancient origin, honored for centuries by governments on both sides of the
Atlantic. Accordingly, if Turner is to be applied at all to a last words
challenge, it should be the more skeptical approach employed by Justice
344. See supra section IV.B.2.
345. Turner, 482 U.S. at 82.
346. Id. at 94-99.
347. See id. at 95 (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) and Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967) (establishing the right to marry as a fundamental right)); id. at 95-96
(reviewing with considerable care the significance of the marital relationship).
348. See id. at 94-96.
349. See id. at 97-99.
350. See id. at 91-93.
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O'Connor in reviewing the marriage restriction. This is because the Court's
prison speech cases are, factually so remote from our scenario. We are
dealing here with an expressive tradition that simply dwarfs the speech
rights that were claimed in those cases. How can one compare the privilege
to utter a last dying speech with the right to hold face-to-face media
interviews?351  Where in Jones and Turner do we see an expressive
privilege traceable back to the 1300s?352 Where in Jones and Turner do we
find a speech tradition that was well established on this side of the Atlantic
a century before the First Amendment's adoption? 3
53
At the end of the day, Turner may be nominally applicable to last words,
but the deferential approach exemplified by the Court's prison speech cases
should be seen as a function of the relatively trivial claims that the Court
was entertaining. As seen with Justice O'Connor's analysis of the marriage
restriction in Turner, judicial scrutiny should be heightened in direct
proportion to the age and stature of the affected right. Accordingly,
restrictions on last words should be analyzed with great skepticism.
G. Original Intent Analysis
When the First Amendment was ratified in 1791, the privilege to utter a
dying speech was more firmly established than most, if not all, of the
expressive freedoms recognized today. Indeed, we are talking here about a
tradition that existed before the Founding Fathers were born; a tradition that
George Washington himself honored; 354 a tradition older than the right to
vote, older than freedom of the press, and much, much older than our
Constitution. Thus, under an original intent analysis, our courts should not
hesitate to recognize a First Amendment right to deliver a last dying speech.
As this Article has already shown, scaffold speeches were consistently
honored at English executions throughout the 1500s.3 55  By 1606, the
privilege to utter a dying speech had become a well-established tradition.356
At that time, by contrast, the "liberties" of speech and press were subject to
ferocious restraint. In 1579, for example, the right hand of an author was
chopped off as punishment for his written attack on the proposed marriage
351. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
352. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
353. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
354. A British prisoner of war, John Andre, was afforded the privilege to deliver a scaffold
speech when executed by order of General George Washington in 1780. LOSSINQ supra note 1,
at 105; DRIMMER, supra note 1, at 147-50.
355. See supra notes 78-88 and accompanying text.
356. FRASER, supra note 3, at 229-34, 265.
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between Queen Elizabeth and the Duke of Anjou. 35 7 In 1603, at the end of
Elizabeth's reign, a printer was hanged, drawn, and quartered for publishing
a book that opposed the ascension of James I to the throne.358 And in 1683,
Algernon Sidney was beheaded 359 for suggesting-in an unpublished
treatise discovered in his study36°--hat the king was accountable to the
people.361
Thus, at a point in history when liberty of expression was negligible at
best, the privilege to deliver a dying speech free from state censorship 362
had already become a tradition. During this time period--spanning the
sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries--the English crown and
Parliament employed three principal devices in suppressing speech and
press: the doctrine of constructive treason, the licensing of the press, and
the law of seditious libel.363
Starting with the reign of Henry VIII and continuing late into the
seventeenth century, the definition of treason was extended (both by statute
and judicial decree) to embrace mere utterances critical of the
government. 364  This innovation, authorizing conviction and death for a
357. FREDRICK SEATON SIEBERT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN ENGLAND 1476-1776, 91-92
(1965); ANNE LYON HAIGHT & CHANDLER B. GRANNIS, BANNED BOOKS 15 (4th ed. 1978); NAT
HENTOFF, THE FIRST FREEDOM: TIE TUMULTUOUS HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH IN AMERICA 57
(1980); Philip Hamburger, The Development of the Law of Seditious Libel and the Control of
the Press, 37 STAN. L. REV. 661, 671 (1985). After this punishment had been inflicted, "[tihe
unfortunate [author], mindful now of the painful hazards of free thought, raised his hat with his
remaining hand and cried, 'God save the Queen!"' HENTOFF, supra at 57.
358. HAIGHT & GRANNIS, supra note 357, at 15; HENTOFF, supra note 357, at 57.
359. 9 COBBETT'S, supra note 7, at 817, 902, 906-07 (discussing the trial of Sidney (K.B.
1683)). Since this crime was deemed treason, Sidney was originally sentenced to the traditional
punishment: "[Y]ou shall be hanged from the neck, and, being alive, cut down, your privy-
members shall be cut off, and burned before your face, yourhead severed from your body, and
your body divided into four quarters, and they to be disposed at the pleasure of the king." Id. at
902. Charles II, in a gesture of indulgence, reduced the sentence to a simple beheading. Id. at
902,906--07.
360. Id. at 860, 898. Sidney testified that he had shown the treatise to no one. Id. at 898.
361. Id. at 819, 838. See LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF AFREE PRESS 9 (1985).
362. See supra notes 104, 110-116, 119-22 and accompanying text.
363. STONE SEIDMAN, supra note 165, at 993; William T. Mayton, Seditious Libel and the
Lost Guarantee of a Freedom of Expression, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 91, 97-98 (1984). See
Hamburger, supra note 357, at 666-73 (observing that, in addition to licensing, treason, and
seditious libel, the crown and Parliament also employed statutes governing heresy, felony, and
"Scandalum Magnatum").
364. SIEBERT, supra note 357, at 265-68; IRVING BRANT, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 26-27
(1965); 4 JOHN REEVES, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 273-74 (Dublin, White 1787);
Hamburger, supra note 357, at 666-67.
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365purely verbal crime, became known as "constructive" treason. A
notorious example is the prosecution of John Twyi, 36 who was tried in
1663 for publishing a book that postulated a right of revolution on the
ground that the king was accountable to the people.367 Twyn was sentenced
to be hanged, cut down while still alive, and then emasculated,
disemboweled, quartered, and beheaded368-4he standard punishment for
treason.369 After executing a teenager in 1720 for printing a dissident
pamphlet, 370 the crown finally abandoned the use of constructive treason. 371
In addition to constructive treason, the English government employed a
second method in controlling the expression of ideas: the licensing of the
37237press. Spurred by the invention of printing in the late fifteenth century,373
the English crown asserted the power to impose editorial control over all
printed matter. 374 Established initially as a right of royal prerogative and
365. LEVY, supra note 361, at 122-23; SIEBERT, supra note 357, at 266; 8 SIR WILLIAM
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 307-17 (Methuen 1937); Mayton, supra note 363,
at 99-100.
366. 6 COBBETr'S COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 513 (London, R. Bagshaw
1810) [hereinafter 6 COBBETr'S] (discussing the trial of Twyn (K.B. 1663)). A sharply
truncated account of the case is set forth at 84 Eng. Rep. 1064 (K.B. 1663).
367. 6 COBBETr'S, supra note 366, at 513. For discussions of the case, see BRANT, supra
note 364, at 124-25; HENTOFF, supra note 357, at 60; LEVY, supra note 361, at 9; Mayton,
supra note 363, at 101; SIEBERT, supra note 357, at 267; THOMAS L. TEDFORD, "FREEDOM OF
SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 16 (1985).
368. 6 COBBETT'S, supra note 366, at 536.
369. LEVY, supra note 361, at 9.
370. John Matthews, a 19-year-old printer, was found in possession of a single-sheet
pamphlet advocating the claim of James Francis Edward Stuart to the throne of England. When
a search of his rooms turned up several more copies of the pamphlet, Matthews was charged
with treason. Though he professed to be unaware of the pamphlet's contents and significance,
Matthews was convicted and hanged. The King v. Matthews, 15 Howell's State Trials 1323
(K.B. 1719). See DONALD THOMAS, A LONG TIME BuRNING 41-42 (1969); HENTOFF, supra
note 357, at 60-61.
371. LEVY, supra note 361, at 9.
372. BRANT, supra note 364, at 98-100; Hamburger, supra note 357, at 671-91, 714-17;
HENTOFF, supra note 357, at 58-60; SIEBERT, supra note 357, at 41-87, 141-46, 186-91.
373. Even before the invention of printing, church officials in England were engaged in
licensing any writings that touched upon matters of religion. SIEBERT, supra note 357, at 42;
Hamburger, supra note 357, at 671-72. As early as 1414, Parliament had confirmed the legal
right of ecclesiastical officers to proceed in open court against the makers and writers of
"heretical" books. 1414, 2 Henry V, stat. 1, cap. 7. But the invention of printing, coupled with
the Reformation, brought forth from continental presses a stream of heretical books that began
to reach London in 1520. SIEBERT, supra note 357, at 42. Church officials, finding it
impossible to control the press, by 1529 surrendered their licensing powers to King Henry VIII.
Id. at 42-45.
374. SIEBERT, supra note 357, at 47-63; Hamburger, supra note 357, at 672; Mayton, supra
note 363, at 106.
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later perpetuated by statute,375 this licensing system criminalized the
publication of any work that had not received advance approval by agents
of the crown. 376 From the mid-sixteenth to the late seventeenth century, 377
the system served as a powerful clamp on dissent: It afforded the crown
prepublication censorship and easy prosecution of offenders, since a
defendant's guilt turned solely on whether he had published without a
license. 378 The penalties for unlicensed printing included confiscation of all
goods and chattels, fine and imprisonment at the will of the crown, and the
posting of bonds to be forfeited upon further misbehavior. 379  These
penalties were designed in part to exert so much pressure upon printers that
they could be tempted to assist the crown, disclosing the whereabouts of
375. The Proclamation of 1538, issued by Henry VIII, was the first attempt to establish a
licensing system for all printed materials in England. SIEBERT, supra note 357, at 48-49;
Mayton, supra note 363, at 106 n.84. It was designed to suppress not just heretical writings but
"seditiouse opinions" as well. SIEBERT, supra note 357, at 48. Following Henry's death in
1547, his successors (Edward VI and Mary) each employed the royal prerogative to keep the
licensing system in place. Id. at 51-56. The long reign of Queen Elizabeth (1558-1603)
featured lasting and comprehensive changes to the licensing system that imposed even tighter
controls on the press. Id. at 56-57, 61-62; HENTOFF, supra note 357, at 59. Under her Star
Chamber Decree of 23 June 1586, printing could only take place at London, Oxford, and
Cambridge; the number of presses was limited; all presses had to be registered with the
Stationers Company, a crown-controlled printers guild; the right to print could be exercised only
by Company members or those having special license from the queen; to ferret out unlicensed
publications, the Company was vested with broad powers of search and seizure; no book could
be published without prior editorial review and approval by agents of the crown. SIEBERT,
supra note 357, at 61-62, 68-70, 82-87; Mayton, supra note 363, at 106 n.84. These provisions
remained in effect until even tighter controls were effected by the Star Chamber Decree of 1637.
This Decree required more exacting prepublication review, imposed more onerous registration
requirements (including a sizable bond that the printer would forfeit for printing anything
unlicensed), and extended the sweep of the licensing laws to imported publications. SIEBERT,
supra note 357, at 61-62, 142-43; 8 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 365, at 367-69; Mayton, supra
note 363, at 106 n.84. In 1643, licensing power shifted from the crown to Parliament. SIEBERT,
supra note 357, at 186-87. Thereafter, licensing authority was based principally upon statute
rather than royal prerogative. Hamburger, supra note 357, at 679-91.
376. STONE SEIDMAN, supra note 165, at 993-94.
377. Hamburger, supra note 357, at 674-75, 678-79.
378. Id. at 673, 690.
379. SIEBERT, supra note 357, at 49. Under the Star Chamber Decree of 23 June 1586,
offending book publishers were to be punished with six months imprisonment and banned from
printing, their equipment to be destroyed. Wardens were authorized to search wherever "they
shall have reasonable cause of suspicion," and to seize all materials printed contrary to the
ordinances. BRANT, supra note 364, at 100. All printing equipment so taken was to be
destroyed and the printing presses "melted, sawed in pieces, broken or battered at the smith's
forge," and returned in that shape to their owners. Id. On 6 June 1558, a royal proclamation
warned that those caught with books proclaimed to be "wicked and seditious.., shall without
delay be executed." HENTOFF, supra note 357, at 59; SIEBERT, supra note 357, at 55.
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dissident authors. 380 Licensing finally ceased in 1694,381 but not from any
nascent commitment to free speech. 382 Instead, as the number of printers
and presses grew, the system became unwieldy, ineffective, and conducive
to bribery.383
By 1769, with licensing a thing of the past, Sir William Blackstone
observed: "The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free
state [-] but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon
publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when
published. 384  Freedom from prior restraint was cold comfort to authors
and printers, because post-publication punishment (even with the demise of
constructive treason 385) could be so easily effected through yet another
device: the doctrine of seditious libel.386
380. HENTOFF, supra note 357, at 59. Before being put to death for publishing a book
maintaining that the king was accountable to the people, see supra notes 366-69 and
accompanying text, John Twyn was offered a reprieve if he would name the author of the work
he had printed. Twyn refused, asserting: "[Bletter... one suffer, than many." 6 COBBETT'S,
supra note 366, at 513, 536 (discussing the trial of Twyn (K.B. 1663)). See HENTOFF, supra
note 357, at 60; Mayton, supra note 363, at 101 n.59.
381. LEVY, supra note 361, at 6, 12; SIEBERT, supra note 357, at 260-63.
382. STONE SEIDMAN, supra note 165, at 994.
383. Id.; SIEBERT, supra note 357, at 263; Hamburger, supra note 357, at 714-17.
384. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 143, at 151. "[W]here blasphemous, immoral, treasonable,
schismatical, seditious, or scandalous libels are punished by the English law," Blackstone
asserted, "the liberty of the press, properly understood, is by no means infringed or violated."
Id. In elaboration, he observed:
Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases
before the public [-] to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press
[-] but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal, he must
take the consequences of his own temerity. To subject the press to the
restrictive power of a licenser, as was formerly done, ...is to subject all
freedom of sentiment to the prejudices of one man, and make him the
arbitrary and infallible judge of all controverted points in learning, religion,
and government. But to punish (as the law does at present) any dangerous or
offensive writings, which, when published, shall . .. be adjudged of a
pernicious tendency, is necessary for the preservation of peace and good
order, of government and religion, the only solid foundations of civil liberty.
Thus the will of individuals is still left free; the abuse only of that free will is
the object of legal punishment.
Id. at 151-52.
385. Hamburger, supra note 357, at 663, 665.
386. LEVY, supra note 361, at 12-13. Though Blackstone identified seditious libel as a
common law doctrine (4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 143, at 150-51), it appears instead to have
been an ad hoc creation of the Star Chamber (Mayton, supra note 363, at 102-03). See Irving
Brant, Seditious Libel: Myth and Reality, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 3-14 (1964) [hereinafter
Seditious Libel] (arguing that seditious libel was entirely a Star Chamber creation and not a
product of the common law); A.T. CARTER, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 148
(Fred B. Rothman & Co. ed. 1986) (1902) (identifying seditious libel as among the crimes that
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Closely akin to constructive treason, 387 and featuring penalties nearly as
severe,38 8 the doctrine of seditious libel was broad enough to criminalize
any comment critical of the government. 389 Born in the Star Chamber in
1606,39 the doctrine was declared in 1680 a common law offense, and thus
within the jurisdiction of the King's Bench. 391 After 1689, concomitant
prosecutions were carried out by Parliament itself, as both the Lords and the
Commons vigorously pursued any publication critical of their actions.
392
were punished in the Star Chamber, and observing that those crimes "were for the most part
unknown to the common law").
387. 2 SIR JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 302
(London, MacMillan 1883); LEVY, supra note 361, at 9; Mayton, supra note 363, at 103-04.
388. Though not a capital offense, seditious libel brought severe punishments, including
whipping, the pillory, indefinite imprisonment, heavy fines, and large bonds (to be forfeited
upon further misbehavior). SIEBERT, supra note 357, at 269-70; LEVY, supra note 361, at 9.
An early Star Chamber decision mentions "loss of ears" as another potential punishment for
seditious libel De Libellis Famosis, 77 Eng. Rep. 250, 250 (Star Chamber 1606). The ferocity
of these punishments is vividly exemplified by the seditious libel prosecution of William Prynn,
the author of a treatise that attacked the English theater and characterized "[w]omen actors" as
"notorious whores." 3 COBBETT'S COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 561, 561-62
(London, R. Bagshaw 1809) (discussing the trial of Prynn (Star Chamber 1632)). Given the
Queen's love of the stage and her own participation in theatrical performances at court, the
attorney general "suspected [Prynn's treatise] to be leveled against the practice of the court, and
the example of the [Q]ueen." Id. at 561-62. For this offense, Prynn was sentenced to
"perpetual imprisonment" and fined 10,000 pounds (a sum that far exceeded his worth).
Moreover, his forehead was branded, his nose was slit, and both of his ears were cut off. Id. at
584-85. See CARTER, supra note 386, at 146 (describing Prynn's case and the general severity
of Star Chamber punishments for seditious libel).
389. LEVY, supra note 361, at 9. In the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the
English common law courts gave so wide a meaning to the term "seditious" that any reflection
on the government in written or printed form was deemed a seditious libel. SIEBERT, supra note
357, at 271. Since it was illegal to publish anything about the government, it was all the more
reprehensible to publish something damaging to the government. Id. at 271-72.
390. De Libellis Famosis, 77 Eng. Rep. at 250. See 2 STEPHEN, supra note 387, at 304; 8
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 365, at 208; Mayton, supra note 363, at 102; Seditious Libel, supra
note 386, at 4-5.
391. 7 COBBETr'S, supra note 7, at 925, 929-30 (discussing the trial of Harris (K.B. 1680))
(Scroggs, L.C.J.) (declaring that "all the judges of England," meeting "by the king's command,"
decided "unanimously" that writing, printing, or selling any publication "scandalous to the
government" is an offense punishable "at the common-law"). See 2 STEPHEN, supra note 387,
at 311-12; Hamburger, supra note 357, at 685-86; Seditious Libel, supra note 386, at 12-14;
Mayton, supra note 363, at 106-07, nn.90-94. Scroggs's reference in Harris to "all the judges
of England" meant the twelve high judges, drawn equally from the courts of King's Bench,
Common Pleas, and Exchequer, who were called upon by the crown for advisory opinions and
occasionally acted together in rendering final decisions after trials. Seditious Libel, supra note
386, at 12 n.33.
392. The English Bill of Rights of 1689 expanded freedom of speech to include members of
Parliament in their official capacity during a legislative session. TEDFORD, supra note 367,
at 13; LEVY, supra note 361, at 14. "Jealous of their new freedom, both houses of Parliament
declared that although they needed freedom of speech, the average citizen did not, and that
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Hundreds of seditious libel trials were conducted in England during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.393 At these trials, the jury was
permitted to decide only one issue: whether the defendant had actually
published the remark. 394 The judges reserved to themselves, as a question
of law, whether the remark constituted seditious libel.395 Truth was no
defense,396 and malicious intent to cause sedition need not be proved.397 In
unwarranted criticism of the lawmakers would be punished." TEDFORD, supra note 367, at 13.
A number of newspaper publishers were tried and convicted of publishing stories critical of
Parliament. TEDFORD, supra note 367, at 14. These prosecutions were conducted on the floor
of either house. "The guilty parties were summoned, examined, and tried in summary fashion;
their criminal publications were burned by the hangman at the order of the house, the party
humiliated, usually on his knees, and forced to pay costs." LEVY, supra note 361, at 14. A
speaker critical of Parliament could be imprisoned for the life of the session by the Commons
and indefinitely by the Lords. LEVY, supra note 361, at 14. After 1730, when English juries
began to rebel in seditious libel cases, "the two houses of Parliament were the principal
deterrents to free and open discussion of political questions through their power to punish a
printer for what today would be considered harmless discussion of public issues." SIEBERT,
supra note 357, at 368. Not until the last quarter of the 18th century did Parliament "quietly
abdicate[ ] its functions as a prosecutor and judge of seditious libels in favor of the attorney
general and common-law courts." SIEBERT, supra note 357, at 374.
393. LEVY, supra note 361, at 17. Siebert notes the great frequency with which printers and
publishers were prosecuted for seditious libel in the later part of the seventeenth century:
"Hardly a year passed without one or two major prosecutions," with sixteen of them during a
seven-month span in 1684. SIEBERT, supra note 357, at 269. Moreover, a chilling effect could
be achieved even without a full-blown prosecution and conviction: "Being arrested, called into
court, and forced to pay costs on the dismissal of the information could have an intimidating
effect even if the prosecution proceeded no further." Convictions, in other words, "were not
necessary for the law of seditious libel to operate oppressively." LEVY, supra note 361, at 10.
394. 7 COBBETT'S, supra note 7, at 925, 929-30 (discussing the trial of Harris (K.B. 1680))
(Scroggs, L.C.J.). See Mayton, supra note 363, at 107; Seditious Libel, supra note 386, at 12-
14. These procedural innovations were imposed by Chief Justice Scroggs at the crown's behest.
2 STEPHEN, supra note 387, at 311-13; 2 JOHN LORD CAMPBELL, THE LIVES OF THE CHIEF
JUSTICES OF ENGLAND 267 (New York, Cockroft 1874); Hamburger, supra note 357, at 685-86.
To achieve this result, Scroggs found it necessary to bully the Harris jury, whose members
initially balked at following his instructions and agreed to an unqualified guilty verdict only
after the recorder commenced polling them individually. 7 COBBETT'S, supra note 7, at 931;
see Seditious Libel, supra note 386, at 13. After getting the verdict he wanted, the Chief Justice
menaced the jury with an angry lecture before letting them go. 7 COBBETT'S, supra note 7, at
931-32; see Seditious Libel, supra note 386, at 13-14.
395. LEVY, supra note 361, at 11-12; 8 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 365, at 342-45; Mayton,
supra note 363, at 107; Seditious Libel, supra note 386, at 13.
396. LEVY, supra note 361, at 12; 8 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 365, at 210; 2 STEPHEN,
supra note 387, at 305. In arriving at this rule, the judges "proceeded on the theory that the
truth of a libel made it even worse because it was more provocative, thereby increasing the
tendency to breach of the peace or exacerbating the scandal against the government." LEVY,
supra note 361, at 12.
397. 2 STEPHEN, supra note 387, at 312; SIEBERT, supra note 357, at 273; Seditious Libel,
supra note 386, at 13.
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this way, the King's Bench perpetuated the crown's prerogative power over
seditious libel, much in the tradition of the Star Chamber.398
This historical sketch confirms that in the centuries preceding the First
Amendment's adoption, the "liberties" of speech and press were subject to
aggressive control and draconian punishment by the state. But during that
same period of history, condemned prisoners were remarkably free to
express themselves on the scaffold.399 In contrast to the press licensing that
prevailed during much of this era, scaffold speeches were not subject to
advance review and approval by the state. 4°° In contrast to the harsh
suppression of anti-government speech that characterized this era,
condemned prisoners were free to convey even a seditious message with
their last words.401
Thus, when the First Amendment was adopted, the privilege to deliver a
dying speech was more firmly established than any other expressive
freedom. That privilege was older, and its exercise freer from state
interference, than any other facet of speech or press liberty. At a point in
history when expressive freedom meant little more than the absence of prior
restraint, 4°2 condemned prisoners were at liberty to use their last words for
any message they desired.40 3 From the perspective of original intent, then,
last words have a stronger claim to constitutional protection than any other
expressive tradition.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has demonstrated that prison policies offend the First
Amendment when they thwart4°4 or disallow 40 5 a traditional dying speech.
The Article began by showing that condemned prisoners in Anglo-
American culture have been afforded the privilege to utter their last words,
free from state censorship, in an unbroken tradition that stretches back at
398. Mayton, supra note 363, at 107-08; accord Seditious Libel, supra note 386, at 12.
Through the influence of Chief Justice Holt, these procedural innovations became a fixture in
the eighteenth century. Hamburger, supra note 357, at 757-58.
399. See supra notes 104, 110-14, 119 and accompanying text.
400. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
401. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
402. See supra note 384 and accompanying text.
403. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
404. Prison policies in Maryland, Virginia, California, and Nevada, for example, allow the
prisoner's last words to be uttered only outside the presence or beyond the hearing of the
witnesses. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
405. Several states, including Pennsylvania, Illinois, North Carolina, South Carolina, and,
until just recently, Ohio, do not allow a condemned prisoner to utter his last dying speech inside
the execution chamber. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
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least 500 years.4 6 Next, the Article identified the striking parallel between
the as-yet-unrecognized right to deliver a dying speech and the well-
established right of "allocution"--the right to be heard just prior to
sentencing.407 The Article then performed a First Amendment analysis of
prison policies that restrict last words.4 8
That analysis began with "first principles,'' 4o examining the instant
policies in terms of the three most prominent rationales for protecting free
expression: the search-for-truth rationale, the self-governance rationale, and
the self-fulfillment rationale. The Article showed that many condemned
prisoners use their last Words as a plea for abolishing capital
punishment-and that such a plea, coming from a person whose own life is
about to be taken, is uniquely capable of grabbing public attention and
changing public sentiment. Policies that restrict dying speeches by
condemned prisoners offend the search-for-truth and self-governance
rationales by eliminating the most riveting form of death penalty criticism.
Such policies offend the self-fulfillment rationale by sending the prisoner to
a muffled and anonymous end, thereby squelching his humanity and
individuality.
Next, this Article examined the instant policies under a succession of
First Amendment doctrines-performing, in turn, a prior restraint
analysis,410 a content-neutrality analysis, 41! a public forum analysis,4 12 an
overbreadth analysis,41 3 a restricted environment analysis,414 and, finally, an
original intent analysis.415
Prior Restraint Analysis. This Article showed that, in two different
respects, the instant policies operate as unconstitutional prior restraints.
They do so, first, by giving the warden advance review and approval power
over the prisoner's statement. Such power is akin to the vesting of
unfettered discretion in a licensing official--a power that the First
Amendment flatly forbids. Second, these policies operate in advance to
silence the prisoner at the very end of his life, foreclosing any spontaneous
communication of the unique thoughts and feelings that may occur to him
as he stands on the brink of extermination.
406. See supra section III.A.
407. See supra section HI.B.
408. See supra section IV.
409. See supra section V.A.
410. See supra Section IV.B.
411. See supra Section IV.C.
412. See supra Section IV.D.
413. See supra Section IV.E.
414. See supra Section IV.F.
415. See supra Section IV.G.
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Content-Neutrality Analysis. Next, this Article demonstrated that the
instant policies should not be viewed as content-neutral. To the extent that
these policies are designed to shield witnesses from unpleasant remarks by
condemned prisoners, they should be struck down, under the strict scrutiny
reserved for content-based restrictions on speech. Ohio, for example,
adopted its policy because of the communicative impact of potential
statements by condemned prisoners4 16 and that is the very definition of a
content-based restriction.
Public Forum Analysis. Since these policies restrict expressive access to
publicly owned property, they are governed by the public forum doctrine.
This Article showed that under any of the three prongs of public forum
analysis-governing traditional, designated, or nonpublic fora-4hese
policies are vulnerable to First Amendment challenge. Through centuries of
history and public custom, the gallows has served as a traditional-or, at the
very least, a designated-public forum. To the extent that these policies are
aimed at suppressing last words that are "offensive" or unpleasant, they
should be struck down under the strict scrutiny that governs content-based
restrictions in traditional or designated public fora. Even if the gallows is
deemed a nonpublic forum, these policies violate the First Amendment by
imposing viewpoint-based restrictions on such a forum. Finally, even if
they are deemed content-neutral, these policies flunk the narrow tailoring
and ample alternative channels requirements by blocking access to a unique
and precious forum: the irreplaceable opportunity to communicate the
thoughts and feelings that surface in the final moments of one's life.
Overbreadth Analysis. This Article demonstrated next that the instant
policies run afoul of the overbreadth doctrine because, in their effort to
suppress a tiny fraction of dying speeches (the very few that feature spiteful
or profane remarks to the victim's family), they deny to all prisoners the
opportunity to speak from the brink of death.
Restricted Environment Analysis. This Article next invoked the line of
First Amendment cases dealing with speech in certain "restricted"
environments: prisons, schools, and the military. The Article showed that
Supreme Court decisions employing a deferential standard to uphold
restrictions on prisoner speech are inapplicable here because none of them
involved a form of expression honored by Anglo-American governments
since the sixteenth century.
Original Intent Analysis. Finally, this Article performed an original
intent analysis, demonstrating that the privilege to utter a dying speech was
416. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
33:1159] 1217
HeinOnline  -- 33 Ariz. St. L.J. 1217 2001
1218 ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J.
more firmly established by 1791 than most, if not all, of the expressive
freedoms recognized today.
It is the author's hope that the historical research and the legal arguments
advanced in this Article will prove helpful to condemned prisoners in
making their last words heard.
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